Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A184-W89
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A184-W89
Release Date: February 11, 2006
发布日：2006年2月11日
Topic: In Review of Year 2005 in China -- by Wei Jingsheng
标题：2005年中国形势回顾 -- 魏京生
Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)
此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）
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In Review of Year 2005 in China
-- By Wei Jingsheng
Another new year has arrived, and everyone holds new hopes. High officials hope to maintain their power and status; low-ranking officials hope to climb up a rung on the ladder; big-time magnates hope to avoid losing money or being kidnapped for ransom; small-time magnates hope for opportunities to dredge up some more cash and to squeeze into the ranks of big-time magnates; workers hope to avoid being furloughed; farmers hope to enter the city and find work; those who do business in China hope to have fewer foreign competitors; those who do business in exports hope that foreign governments place fewer restrictions on them; the common people hope that the rule of law can protect their rights and interests and prevent them from being taken advantage of by the powerful; angry youth hope that restrictions on their smashing embassies can be loosened so that they can give vent to the grudges they hold in their hearts ....
People hope for this and that, and everyone has hopes. Moreover, these hopes are linked together with the development trends of society and the nation as a whole. To put it another way, the movement of society and the nation will directly or indirectly affect the fate of every individual. Only when we become clear on these major trends can we know how what needs to be done for our own hopes to become reality. Due to the Chinese Communist Party's opaque political traditions, becoming clear on the trends isn't that easy. I'll just try to help everyone to analyze the situation; perhaps this will be of assistance to everyone. Before analyzing the trends of the coming year, I would like to briefly revisit last year's trends. The special characteristic of trends in China last year was that the economy maintained its high-speed growth, but development inequalities were further enlarged. Since the unfair wealth allocation situation hasn't changed, the three-fourths of the population that have low incomes did not experience a rise in incomes; only the middle-to-high income classes unreasonably had a rise in incomes. Thus, the scope of growth of the Chinese consumer market hasn't grown much and is also deformed, as the increased production came mainly in goods dumped on the international markets. This has brought about three types of consequences:
1. Major western markets have gradually set up trade barriers, so the stability and capacity of the export market has lowered, and export costs have risen. The feedback has caused the China market to become more unstable.
2. The increase in the capacity of the economy has not impacted China's consumer market and has instead transformed into savings in bank accounts and foreign-exchange reserves. Moreover, great amounts of property have been left abroad, becoming increases in the capacities of other nations' economies, lessening reinvestment sums in China, as well as the vitality of development.
3. The scope of investment projects in China is smaller than the growth of the labor force. The actual incomes of workers and peasants have lowered, and the pressures of unemployment have increased, bringing about the further intensification of social conflicts.
In the past two year, the manifestation of the intensification of social conflicts has truly left people shocked. The bloody incident in Shantou of Guangdong Province is relatively representative. Since issues of compensation for land requisitioned for construction were resolved in an unreasonable manner, a bloody large-scale clash ensued between farmers and armed police. The fundamental reason behind is was the clash of interests between the bureaucratic capitalist class and the farmers that hadn't benefited enough from development. This is a new type of clash. It has both similarities and differences with the large-scale clashes that occurred in undeveloped areas in the past few years. The similarities are that the land privatization issue hasn't been resolved and that the bureaucratic capitalist class both utilizes its property rights to achieve extremely high profits and has also deprived the common people of their proper interests. This is a typical instance of human rights infringements that lead to infringements of interests bringing about clashes. The differences are that the turmoil caused by these infringements has developed from the most impoverished class of the most impoverished regions all the way to the general masses, proceeding to relatively well-off classes in more developed regions. The social conflicts brought about by the inadequacy of property safeguards have rapidly expanded and extended to include all different social classes and the majority of the population. Since the rule of law has been corrupted, the clashes continue to escalate, and follow a trend of going from conflicts to clashes to turmoil. These are the primary reasons why class conflicts have deepened and why the scale and scope of turmoil continues to expand.
The deepening of class polarization and the intensification of class conflicts has been caused by the reduced Chinese consumer market and a distorted social allocation system. This manifests not only in land-requisition disputes, but also in various aspects of society. The most prominent manifestations are the worsening of social order and the rapid rise of the criminal underworld. This trend has gradually developed over the last twenty-plus years, and has accelerated recently. By last year, it had already become a crisis that whole society has found hard to tolerate. Long-term unemployment and extreme poverty has forced a portion of the populace to break the law and take desperate risks; these people have gradually come together and formed large or small organizations. In the areas that the government doesn't care about to disrupt social order, these organizations maintain another form of social order -- unite the semi-lawful power of the people, they have formed criminal underworld alliances, and have now advanced to the point that they collude with government forces, allowing criminal underworld forces to penetrate into the management system of whole society, to the point that they partially influence government operations. China's criminal underworld has already far surpassed the level it was at in the previous century. With the absence of wars or separatist regimes, the scale of these groups has developed to the point that they clearly weaken official authority, to the point they independently exercise authority in managing social classes. In many large- or mid-sized cities, people can no longer tell clearly who are police officers and who are gang members. To members of all social classes, their sense of security has fallen to wartime levels, and the legal system is no longer one that people can rely on for protection. Such phenomena indicate that China's social conflicts have already approached their limits. Not only poor people but also the power holding wealthy class feels that this environment has already developed to an intolerable extent. Thinking of change is not only something guided by idealism but a need of every member of society. These are the basic trends we have seen in Chinese society over the past year.
So the distorted development of Chinese economy has brought about three kinds of consequences: export prospects for this year are dim, investments in China have lowered, and the pressure of unemployment has increased. The social conflicts triggered by these consequences are prominent in that the clashes brought about by countless property rights issues have become more serious, and the criminal underworld has grown. Apart from these social conflicts intensifying, various sorts of political conflicts are also becoming more acute to different extents, bringing about a vicious cycle.
Media both inside and outside China have reported relatively more on an issue, namely, that the Chinese democracy movement has become a human rights defending movement and has united the personal interests of the broad masses; the media has done relatively less purely idealistic media speculation. As a result, the movement has spread from just campuses in 1989 to all levels of society today. The various forms of human rights activities in the media have been activities that are not politicized or meant for the purpose of forming a political party. Many officials, civil organizations, and media organizations have participated in human rights activities to varying extents, allowing human rights activities at the lower rungs of society to obtain political and legal support and to improve in terms of proficiency. It has allowed a portion of those in the intellectual class to leave the path of heading towards corruption and to once again undertake their role as society's bearers of conscience. The sign for the rapid expansion of this contingent of conscience-supporters is that the success rate of human rights activities in various social classes is continually improving. In addition to the fact that overseas media outlets have reported on certain major incidents, the fact that everyday people in their daily lives, periodical publications, and lawyers have all joined in the movement has created unprecedented obstacles for those who rely on power-holders to illegally infringe upon others' rights and interests. The number of cases of rights infringements with tacit government support that have been rectified or partially rectified is rapidly increasing, and the reputation of the media and lawyers in the eyes of the people has raised somewhat. The intellectual class has, in an unprecedented manner, become a factor in stabilizing society and mitigating conflicts. Compared with the situation in the past, in which they mainly relied on government authority, its improvement suppressed the past. For example: government authority continues to decline, and independent civil forces and criminal underworld forces continue to expand; the trend is moving towards a small government and large society. It's not beneficial to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but relatively beneficial to civil society.
However, in this trend of small government and large society, there is no guarantee as to the political system. The CCP-guided politics are still developing along the pattern set in the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin Eras. This pattern is that the political regime and politics strategy making body, including that of the judicial system, and that control remains in the hands of those in the upper classes of society. What it represents is not the interests of the various classes of Chinese society, much less the lower classes that make up three-fourths of the population, but the interests of the bureaucratic capitalist class, which makes up a small portion of the population but which controls the majority of the wealth. People can see from legislation, the judiciary, and policy-making how the wealthy class has gained more and more obvious consideration, while the poor get less and less. It has gotten to the point that when officials in Guangdong Province talk about the bloody Shanwei incident, they can publicly talk about how not giving compensation to and suppressing the "mob" were reasonable and legal actions. Scholars who stand close to the government have also strongly called on the government not to attack the wealthy class, saying that it instead should forcefully put down unruly people and mobs. These phenomena all show that the Chinese communist regime is completing its process of going from a one-party dictatorship that represents the entire public to a class dictatorship that represents the bureaucratic capitalist class. At the same time, it has gone from the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Eras, which the majority of people supported, to a post-Communist era that only the bureaucratic capitalist class supports. The "post-Communist Era" is an era of a capitalist-class dictatorship with a weakening power base. During this era, class conflicts have already become the primary conflicts in society, relegating social strata-based conflicts regarding education levels or living environments to a secondary position.
What the media paid less attention to be the situation last year in which military officers that were sent home or transferred to civilian work demonstrated in the streets and made noise. In the past, every springtime when the military sent people home or to civilian work, there would always be widespread but small-scale incidents. Yet what transpired last year were large-scale incidents, and because of this, a law was passed prohibiting servicemen from demonstrating. This is a sign of the transformation and intensification of social conflicts, as well as how they have penetrated into every corner of society. Military management hasn't been able to adapt to the changes in social realities; thus, veterans haven't been able to find the employment help they seek and have no choice but to take desperate risks. Servicemen are the most conservative and stable group in society. If this group is unable to endure the pressures of injustice in society, it shows that these injustices have reached their limit and are close to causing an eruption.
The 28 years before the CCP established its regime was the Mao Zedong Era. The social system established in this era is financially one of ownership by all the people and collective ownership but politically a one-party dictatorship. It is stable in terms of the political and economic systems adapting to one another. But in actuality it is unstable, because traditionally the Chinese people are used to a market economy, not a serf system, especially with the relative poverty brought about by the backwardness of the Chinese economy. These are two fundamental reasons that ended in the Mao Zedong Era. The 28 years afterward were the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin Eras. Their characteristics were to gradually establish a semi-market economic system and maintain the one-party autocratic political system. The economic and social system's clashes with Chinese traditional culture lessened, but the conflicts between the economic and social systems and marketization increased. The political system and the realities of the judicial system conflicted more with the market economy as well. This is the reality we face today.
(Written on January 20, 2006. Partially broadcasted by Radio Free Asia. The Wei Jingsheng Foundation is responsible for the accuracy of this version of the English translation.)
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中文版
Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A184-W89
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A184-W89
Release Date: February 11, 2006
发布日：2006年2月11日
Topic: In Review of Year 2005 in China -- by Wei Jingsheng
标题：2005年中国形势回顾 -- 魏京生
Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)
此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）
如有中文乱码问题，请与我们联系或访问:
http://www.weijingsheng.org/report/report2006/report2006-01/WeiJS060211ChinaSituationA184-W89.htm
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2005年中国形势回顾
-- 魏京生
又是新的一年来到了，大家都会对新的一年抱有一些希望。当大官的希望保住自己的权势地位；当小官的希望能更上一层楼；大款们希望在新的一年里不赔本儿，不被绑票儿；小款们希望能有机会捞它一把，也挤进大款的行列；工人们希望别摊上下岗；农民们希望能进城找到工作；在国内做生意的希望外国的竞争者少一点儿；做出口生意的希望外国政府少一点儿限制；小老百姓希望法制能够保护他们的权利，别让有权有势的人给欺负了；愤青们希望能放宽他们砸大使馆的限制，以泻胸中的怨愤……..
希望这个希望哪个，每个人都有所希望。然而这些个希望都和整个国家与社会的发展趋势联系在一起。换言之，国家与社会的走势，直接或间接地影响着每一个人的命运。搞清楚大形势，才能知道自己的希望怎样才能实现。由于中国共产党不透明的政治传统，搞清楚形势也不是那么容易。我就试着帮大家分析分析，也许对大家会有所帮助吧。在分析今年将要发生的形势之前，我们先简单回顾一下过去的形势。过去一年国内形势的特点是：经济发展仍保持高速度，但发展的不均衡进一步加大。由于分配的不公平没有改变，占人口四分之三的低收入阶层的收入没有增加；只有中高收入阶层的收入不合理地增加了。所以国内消费市场的增长幅度不大而且畸形，所增长的产品主要向国际市场倾销。这就引起了三种后果：
1． 西方主要市场渐渐地筑起贸易壁垒，出口市场的容量和稳定性下降，出口成本增加。反过来影响到国内市场不稳定。
2． 经济增量没有反映在国内消费市场，而是转化为存款和外汇储备。并有大量财产滞留在国外，变成其他国家的经济增量，减缓了国内再投资额，减少了发展的后劲。
3． 由于国内投资实业的幅度小于劳动力增长的幅度。工人农民的实际收入下降，失业压力增大，引发各种社会矛盾的进一步激化。
过去的两年中，社会矛盾激化的表现，确实让人怵目惊心。广东汕头血案比较具有代表性。由于建设占地的赔偿问题解决不合理，引发了农民和武警之间的大规模流血冲突。其根本原因是官僚资产阶级和没有从发展中获得充分利益的农民阶级之间的利益冲突。这是新类型的冲突。它和前几年内地不发达地区的大规模冲突既有相同之处，也有不同之处。相同之处是土地私有化没有解决，官僚资产阶级利用财产权数不清获得高额利润的同时，剥夺了老百姓的应有利益。这是典型的侵犯人权导致侵犯利益引发的冲突。不同之处在于，这种侵犯造成的动乱，已从最贫困地区的最贫困阶级发展到了一般民众；进而发展到了较发达地区的相对不贫困阶级。财产保障不充分引发的社会矛盾，呈现出迅速扩大蔓延到社会各阶级和大部分人口的趋势。由于法制败坏，冲突在不断升级，呈现出从矛盾到冲突到动乱的趋势。成为阶级矛盾加深，动乱规模和范围不断扩大的主要原因。
畸形的社会分配和紧缩的国内消费市场造成的阶级分化加深和阶级矛盾尖锐化的趋势。不仅表现在征地纠纷一个方面，而且在社会各个方面的都有体现。比较突出的是社会治安恶化和黑社会迅速崛起。这种趋势在过去二十几年中逐渐发展，且呈加速态势。到去年，已成为使整个社会难以容忍的危机。长期失业和极度贫困迫使一部分人铤而走险，这些人逐渐聚集在一起形成大大小小的组织。从破坏秩序到政府不管的空间，维持另类秩序，结合民间半合法的势力组成黑社会联盟，再进化到与官方势力勾结，使黑社会势力渗透到整个社会的管理体系，直到部分地影响到政治运作。中国的黑社会现已远远超过上个世纪的水平。在没有战争和割据的前提下，规模已达到明显削弱官方权威，甚至自立权威管理社会的阶段。在许多大中城市，人们已经弄不清到底谁是警察谁是黑帮了。对社会各阶层来说，安全感已降低到战争年代的水平，法制体系已不再是人们可以信赖的保障。这种种现象，都预示着中国的社会矛盾已接近极限。不仅是穷人，包括有权有势的阶级都感到这个环境已到了无法忍耐的程度。人心思变不再是理想主义的引导，而成了社会每一个成员的需要。这就是过去的一年中，我们看到的中国社会的基本形势。
总之，中国国内经济畸形发展造成了三个方面的结果，使得今年出口前景暗淡；国内投资不振；失业压力增大。这些所引发的社会矛盾突出表现在，因财产权属不清而导致的冲突更趋严重，以及黑社会化进一步加深。除了这些社会矛盾的激化以外，各种政治矛盾也在不同程度上尖锐化，并且表现出恶性循环的趋势。
国内外媒体较多报道的一件事情，是国内民主运动转型为维权运动后，结合了广大民众的切身利益，而较少进行纯理想主义的媒体炒作。结果是从８９年的校园扩展到了现在的社会各阶级。各种形式的维权活动，表现在媒体上是非政治化和非政党化的活动。很多官方和民间的机构和媒体，都在不同程度上参与到维权运动中来，使社会底层的维权活动得到政治和法律的支持而提高了水平，也使得知识分子阶层中的一部分，从走向腐败的三种精英相结合的道路上分离出来，重新回到了肩负起社会良心的道路上来。这支社会良心的队伍迅速扩大的标志，就是各阶级维权活动的成功率在不断提高。除了海外媒体热炒的一些大案之外，普通百姓们日常生活中，报刊媒体和律师们的大量介入，使得依仗权势非法侵占他人权益的活动遭遇到前所未有的阻力。被纠正或部分纠正的有官方背景的侵权案迅速增加，媒体和律师在人们心目中的信誉有些上升。知识分子阶层前所未有地开始成为稳定社会、缓和矛盾的因素。与过去主要依赖官方权威的状态相比，形成了此消彼长的关系。即：官方权威不断下降，民间自身的力量和黑社会力量不断扩大，趋势走向是小政府大社会。对中共不利而对民间社会比较有利。
但这种小政府大社会的转化趋势，并没有政治制度上的保证。中共主导下的政治，仍然按照邓小平江泽民时代的格局向前发展。这个格局就是政权和政治决策以及司法体系，继续控制在社会上层阶级手中。它代表的不是中国社会各阶级的利益，更不是占人口四分之三以上的中下层阶级，而是占人口少数而占有大多数财富的官僚资产阶级。人们可以从立法、司法和行政决策等等方面看出来，富裕阶层得到了越来越明显的关切，而穷人得到越来越少的关切。以致于广东省的官员在谈到汕尾血案时，可以振振有词地以法律为理由，论证他们不给于补偿费和镇压所谓的暴民，是合理合法的行为。靠拢政府的学者们也强烈呼吁政府不要打击富裕阶级，而应着重镇压刁民和暴民。这种种现象都说明，中国的共产党政权，正在完成从代表全民的一党专政转化为代表官僚资产阶级的阶级专政的过程。与此同时，它也从得到大多数人拥护的毛泽东、邓小平时代，进入到只得到官僚资产阶级拥护的后共产党时代。所谓后共产党时代，就是权力基础薄弱的资产阶级专政的时代.在这个时代中，阶级矛盾已成为社会的主要矛盾，由教育程度和生活环境造成的社会阶层之间的矛盾退居次要地位。
媒体较少关注的事件，是去年在军队中发生的复原转业军官示威游行和闹事的情况。以往每年春季复原转业时期，都会有普通但是小规模的事情发生。而去年发生的是大规模的事件，并为此颁发了禁止军人游行示威的法律。这标志着社会矛盾的激化和转型，已渗透到社会的每一个角落。军队的管理没能适应社会现实的变化，使得退伍军人不可能得到他们预期的安置，不得不铤而走险。军人是一个社会中最保守最稳定的集团，如果这个集团也不能承受社会不公正的压力，就说明这个不公正已经达到了极限，临近爆发的时机了。
共产党建立政权的前２８年是毛泽东时代。这个时代建立起的社会制度，是经济上的全民所有制和集体所有制，政治上的一党专政。从政治体制与经济体制相适应的角度上看，它处于稳定状态。但事实上它不稳定，原因是中国人的传统文化更适应市场经济而不适应农奴制，再加上中国经济落后带来的相对贫困。这两条是毛泽东时代结束的根本原因。后２８年是邓小平江泽民时代。它的特点是逐步建成了半市场经济体制和维持政体制上的一党专制。经济社会体制与中国传统文化的冲突减缓了，经济社会体制与市场化的矛盾增强了，政治体制和司法现实与市场经济的矛盾也增强了。这就是我们现在所面临的现实。
（写于2006年1月20日）
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魏京生基金会及中国民主运动海外联席会议以推动中国的人权与民主为己任。
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魏京生基金会地址:
415 East Capitol Street, SE, Suite 2, Washington, DC 20003-3810，USA
魏京生基金会通讯地址：
Wei Jingsheng Foundation, P. O. Box 15449, Washington, DC 20003, USA
电话: 1-202-543-1538 传真：1-202-543-1539
紧急联系：1-202-270-6980 (黄慈萍)
魏京生基金会网址：WWW.weijingsheng.org
中国民主运动海外联席会议及中国团结工会的网址为：www.ChinaLaborUnion.org
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