Wei
Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A710-W447
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号： A710-W447
Release
Date: May 15, 2012
发布日：2012年5月15日
Topic:
Congressional Testimony at the May 15, 2012, Hearing of Chen Guangcheng by US
House Committee on Foreign Affairs -- WEI Jingsheng
标题：2012年5月15日在美国国会众议院外交委员会就陈光诚事件的证词 -- 魏京生
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Congressional
Testimony
at
the hearing of Chen Guangcheng: His Case, Cause, Family, and Those Who are
Helping Him
-- WEI,
Jingsheng
Chair,
Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition
May
15, 2012
House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human
Rights
In
September 1993, I was released half a year ahead of schedule, with conditions
restricting my personal freedoms. Such a release is called as a controlled
released by China law. The supervision would not end until Mary 29, 1994, at
the end of my 15-year sentence.
After
being released from the prison, I had done the following work:
1)
Helped to collect donations for individuals and organizations subject to political
persecutions.
2)
Purchased bank stock shares as a preparation for facilitating money transfers.
3)
Planed to establish independent workers' unions for workers;
4)
Planed to set up non-governmental organizations for artists to relieve them
from exploitations of the government;
5)
Assisted in offering 1 billion yuans' worth of stock in state-owned
enterprises, and in proving with facts after making huge profits that the
government had been manipulating the stock market to exploit mass investors.
In
January 1994, I met with US Congressman Chris Smith for 3 hours in a restaurant
in Beijing. We talked about the
issue of human rights and democracy in China. Later I learnt that he proposed then US Secretary o State
Warren Christopher, to meet with me during his Beijing visit.
On
February 27, 1994, I met with US Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck
privately in a restaurant. He asked me if I was willing to meet Warren
Christopher, the US Secretary of State,
to discuss human rights issues in China when Christopher would visit
China in the following month.
Shattuck mentioned about debates in the US Congress on decoupling human
rights from trade issues, and potential risks of this meeting.
I
thought if my opinions would have some effect in preventing the US from moving
backward on human rights issues in China, I'd be willing to take such risks and
meet the Secretary of State. Shattuck mentioned that my opinions had been
passed on to President Clinton by Senator Kerry and already had a positive
effect on the setup of Radio Free Asia. He hoped my views could help the
Secretary of State Christopher. We discussed and agreed on some details of the
meeting with Secretary of State Christopher during his visit.
In
a morning about two or three days later, a police who had been in charge of my
surveillance came to my home, and said their superior would like to talk to
me. Later, they brought me to a
resort hotel near the Ming Tombs Reservoir, saying that I should relax here and
wait for their superior. I asked whom I would meet and what to discuss, but got
no answers.
On
the next day, an official came, who claimed to be a senior official
representing the highest authority. By observing the way he casually dismissed
the police officers to have a private talk with me, I could tell that his
status should be true. Based on the fact that he had to leave for half a hour
after our talk then came back with responses, I would assume there were
officials with higher rankings nearby who monitored our conversations and made
decisions.
At
the very beginning of the talk, this official said that it was a negotiation,
because they needed my help. He said that he knew I had an appointment to meet
the US Secretary of State, and also knew my opinions. "We could not change
your opinions and will not want to do so. But we wish you would not meet the US
Secretary of State."
I
said that's not possible. Since I had agreed to meet, I couldn't break the
promise.
He
said that they could offer things in exchange. "We know what you want to
do," he said. "If only you will not meet the US Secretary of State,
we will agree to what you want."
I
said I did not believe things could be so simple. Why was it so important for
me to meet or not with The US Secretary of State? Why would you agree to let me
do the things that you had been prohibiting us from doing just because of this?
He
said, "You might not know how important the Sino-US trade is to us: taking
away those false figures, 70% of our real profit was from the foreign trade,
and 70% of that came from the Sino-US trade because the US market's profit was
higher. You might think we the Communist government would collapse without the
American profit, which is true. I would want to do the same if I were you. But
the Chinese people would suffer and many Chinese companies would go bankrupt.
Since you love the people very much, we had guessed that you would agree to our
offers."
I
said: "Not really. I believe that the collapse of the Communist government
and the establishment of a democracy system would be more beneficial to the
Chinese people. It would be the lesser of two evils. And the interests of the
Chinese people would be better compensated in the future."
He
said that "You have described the issue too simply. You were once in our
internal circle, and should know politics. Do you really think it would lead to
trade sanctions?
I
said why not?
He
said that the interests of both China and the US had dictated that trade
sanctions, if any, would be short lived. The businesses of countries would not
allow them to continue to the degree that I would need, i.e., resulting in the
collapse of the Communist government.
I
said in that case, you had no need to negotiate with me. You also know that I'd rather stay in
prison than give up the principles.
He
said: "We knew that. We understand you better than your comrades. But we
also hoped that you could think about it carefully. Someone would have to hold
the responsibility for even short-term sanctions, and the highest authority
would be forced to step down because of it. That's why someone wanted to make a fuss on you, and why we
had to protect you from getting into trouble."
He
also said that "You might laugh at me for such a low-level lie, but I have
to tell you that it was the truth. You are now standing at the focal point of
the Sino-US relationship. If you were in trouble, whether real or false, the
highest authority would bathe in shit. Only after he steps down, could others
take his position. Therefore, some people are eager to get you in trouble to
achieve their own objectives. When they reach their goals, they would cooperate
with the US government to resolve the trade issues. But you would lose your
chance to reach your own goals. You should know better about the stakes in this
deal."
I said
"I still do not believe in your promises. I would need an assurance. The
stepping down of Jiang Zeming might not be a bad thing, and the person
replacing him might want to compromise with us as well."
He
said "We would agree with the several things that you want to do. Would
you think about it again? I have something to do, and will be back in half an
hour."
He
gave me a piece of paper with the offers listed on it. The first one was to
release political prisoners, including a list of 35 names. The next three were
also what I really wanted to do, i.e., establishing workers' unions,
establishing artists' own businesses, and purchasing bank shares and helping
with the receiving and transfer of humanitarian donations.
After
more than a hour, the official - who's last name was Guo - came back and asked
how I thought about it.
I
said "What you agreed to means nothing: the establishment of a workers'
union requires approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs; an artists' company
requires approval from the Ministry of Culture; and purchase of bank shares
requires approval from the People's Bank. Those were not under the authority of
the Judiciary branch. Therefore, all of what you have said sounds like
lies."
He
said: "I repeat again that I am representing the highest authority to
negotiate with you. All these items are within our scope of power. When the
time comes, I will help you to complete all the procedures."
I
still said that I could hardly believe what he just said.
He
said "How about this: we will add one more offer that you would be able to
see. In addition to releasing the political prisoners, provided that you don't
betray your promise, we will not arrest any of your people." by which he
meant all pro-democracy activists.
I
said "But you just detained a number of pro-democracy activists recently
who were not on your list. What about those people?"
He
said those who got detained recently had not get in the legal procedures yet.
"If you give me one day, I will get them all released. We could decide
tomorrow whether you would accept our offers. Tomorrow you could make phone
calls to verify if we had the ability to keep our promise."
The
next day I called several friends and verified that those detained were
released without either conditions or explanations. But I was still inclined
not to accept their offers.
This
official seemed very anxious and almost lost his posture, and told me that
"You must know that we are already bearing a great deal of risk. We have
also explained it within the Communist Party. If you still disagreed, then we
would have to arrest you, which would just be playing into the hands of the
other side, and all the offers to you would be blown away."
Then
he added: "The Americans are not as reliable as you might think, and could
ultimately reach a compromise with the new leader. Then political prisoners
would be rounded up as usual, and you would not be able to complete anything
that you wanted to do. You should think about what is at stake. Let me give you
a worse case scenario. Even if we recanted in the future, you at least got the
benefit of having the political prisoners released. The other side might not
even give you that benefit."
At
this time, I felt that the credibility of his words was pretty high, so I
accepted their offers and made a detailed plan for me to leave Beijing to seek
medical treatments, and I politely declined to meet Secretary of State
Christopher. I felt that I definitely would not get these offers through the
meeting with the Secretary of State. And if the US were to insist on
scrutinizing the human rights issues in China, it would not have canceled the
annual review of the Most Favored Nation status.
The
offers included the proviso that immediately after Secretary of State
Christopher had left Beijing, I could go back to the city and continue to do
what I wished to accomplish, and they would fulfill their remaining offers.
On
March 29, 1994, while I was in Jinan, they notified me two things: first, I had
completed my prison sentence and would no longer be under their control, and
all my civil rights were restored. Second, although Secretary of State
Christopher had already left China, the situation had changes somewhat, and
they hoped I could spend some time relaxing in the South and return to Beijing
after one or two months. I rejected the second request and insisted on going
back to Beijing according to the original conditions. I thought by doing so, I
could verify if they had the ability to fulfill their promise.
Two
days later, I entered the highway from Tianjin to Beijing. But the entire
highway was closed with just the car carrying my friend and me and four police
cars surrounding us. When we arrived at the exit of Tong County, we were
blocked by more than one hundred police officers, including agents from several
different departments of the Public Safety Bureau, and officials from the State
Security Bureau and the Procuratorate.
A
police officer, whom I was familiar with and who has been in charge of my
surveillance for many days, told me that the current situation was too
complicated and they did not know what was going on either. He asked me not to
make a stiff scene, and they were doing backroom negotiations. Later, a
policeman whom I did not recognize came and showed me a subpoena. They took me
and the businessman, who was going to transfer stock shares of one billion
yuan's worth, to a counterfeit antique making company in Tong County.
I
slept until the afternoon, and then heard the policeman I knew arguing with
someone. I heard a strange voice saying: we got orders that no one was allowed
to meet him alone. The policeman I knew said: we got instructions from our
superior that we must meet with him alone. You had no authorization to listen
to our conversation, and your superior had agreed to this.
Then
they made phone calls. After that, the police officer I knew took me to a
private room in an outside restaurant, and told me that after the departure of
Secretary of State Christopher, the debate within the Communist Party got more
heated. The other side did not believe the Americans, and also did not believe
that I did not influence the Americans. They insisted on handling me by the
dictatorship theory of the Communist Party, and did not think that they should
abide by the terms of the agreement, otherwise it would be a loss of the spirit
and principle of the Communist Party. Their superior was dealing with this
conflict and they asked me to be more patient. I said I did not know their
internal affairs, but my patience had a time limit.
On
the third day, I formally informed the police who were guarding me that
according to the Law of Criminal Procedures, a subpoena for interrogation could
not last longer than three consecutive days. Unless they could get an arrest
warrant, I would leave by my own this evening. They said "You just wait,
we will go immediately to the Procuratorate to get the arrest warrant."
At
evening, I asked if they got the arrest warrant. They said not yet. The
Procuratorate would not issue an arrest warrant. But they had got a residential
surveillance certificate issued by the Public Safety Bureau, which did not need
approval from the Procuratorate. I said that "Residence under Surveillance
meant that I would stay in my own home and there would be no restriction of my
personal freedom, I just could not leave your surveillance. What you are doing
now is an illegal detention."
They
laughed at me and said that I should not try to use their legal loopholes.
Their laws would be interpreted by them, not by my own understanding. Although
there was none, they could create a precedent for me in regarding this
"Residence under Surveillance".
And because it did not get into the legal procedure, they did not even
need to notify my family members. I would not have any rights provided by the
law. Thus they started an illegal detention against me that lasted 18 months,
without newspapers and TV, without any contact with the outside world.
From
what I learned later, at least by the summer of 1995, the promises of releasing
political prisoners and no arrest of my people had been kept for about a year.
I think it was because the trade sanctions could not be lifted smoothly, and
the American people still cared about human rights situations in China.
Otherwise, Jiang Zemin would not be able to get a compromise between the trade
and the theory of dictatorship under the Chinese Communist Party.
From
this process, we can learn several features concerning negotiations with the
Chinese Communist regime.
1)
They are only restrained by their interests, but not bound by their promises.
That is because, fundamentally, they do not recognize common knowledge and
reason, but only their great ideals. This is the same as all evil cults.
Therefore, by insisting on staying in China, Mr. Chen Guangcheng made a wrong
judgment due to a lack of common knowledge. And the US government did not let
him learn such a common knowledge, and thus brought to himself the trouble that
will come up.
2)
The Chinese government is not a whole, but consists of various interest groups.
The struggles within those factions lack rules, and national interests often
become bargaining chips between their negotiations. Promises made by one
faction often become targets to be attacked by other factions. Non-compliance
of agreements is a common happening in China. The US government, by believing
in promises made by one particular faction without any assurance, has made a
mistake of political judgments.
3)
Taking a hostage first and then making negotiations is a traditional way of
negotiation by the Chinese Communists. In their ideology, obtaining maximum
benefit regardless of means is a legitimate method against those who are deemed
as not fit to their ideals. They would use any means to advance their
interests, which is their official theory. By returning Mr. Chen Guangcheng to
the hands of Chinese police, the US government has made yet another mistake of
political judgment, and will pay an extra price for it.
Related
photo of Wei Jingsheng testifies in the US Congress:
http://www.weijingsheng.org/pic/newsletters/newsletters2012/newsletters2012-2/WeiJStestifies120515inCongress.jpg
Related
photo of the Congressional hearing:
http://www.weijingsheng.org/pic/newsletters/newsletters2012/newsletters2012-2/Congress120515hearing.jpg
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中文版
Wei
Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A710-W447
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号： A710-W447
Release
Date: May 15, 2012
发布日：2012年5月15日
Topic:
Congressional Testimony at the May 15, 2012, Hearing of Chen Guangcheng by US
House Committee on Foreign Affairs -- WEI Jingsheng
标题：2012年5月15日在美国国会众议院外交委员会就陈光诚事件的证词 -- 魏京生
Original
Language Version: English (Chinese version at the end)
此号以英文为准（英文在前，中文在后）
如有中文乱码问题，请与我们联系或访问:
http://www.weijingsheng.org/report/report2012/report2012-05/WeiJStestimony120515CongressA710-W447.htm
-----------------------------------------------------------------
2012年5月15日在美国国会众议院外交委员会就陈光诚事件的证词
-- 魏京生
1993年9月份，我被提前半年释放。这释放的同时附带有限制人身自由的条件，按中国的法律叫做管制。时间延长到1994年3月29日15年刑满时，才可以解除管制。
我出狱后从事了以下的工作：
1) 帮助受政治迫害的人和组织征求捐款；
2) 购买银行股份准备提供转钱的方便；
3) 计划为工人组织独立工会；
4) 计划为艺术家们组织非政府的公司，免除艺术家们受政府剥削的困扰
5) 协助发行10亿元国有企业股份，并在获得暴利后以事实证明政府操纵股市剥削股民。
1994年1月，我与美国国会议员克利斯朵夫﹒史密斯在北京的一家餐馆里就推动中国的人权和民主的主题进行了３个小时的会谈。后来我得知，史密斯议员向当时的美国国务卿克里斯多夫建议，在克里斯多夫来北京访问时与我会见。
1994年2月27日，我和美国国务院助理国务卿沙特克在餐馆中私下会面。他向我询问在下个月国务卿克里斯多夫访问中国时，是否愿意和国务卿见面讨论中国的人权事务。他提到了美国议会中关于人权与贸易脱钩的争论，也提到了这次会面可能具有的风险。
我认为如果我的意见能有效果，阻止美国在中国人权事务上倒退，我愿意冒这个风险和国务卿先生见面。他提到我的意见被克里参议员带给克林顿总统，已经对建立自由亚洲电台产生了正面的作用。他希望我的意见能给国务卿先生帮助。我们就此商定了在克里斯多夫国务卿访问期间会谈的一些细节。
过了两到三天的一个早晨，一直负责监视我的警察来到我家里，说是他们领导要找我谈话。之后，他们把我带到了十三陵水库附近的一个度假村旅馆，说是让我在此休息等待他们的领导。我询问谈话的对象和内容，他们一概以不知道回答。
第二天来了一位自称代表最高当局的高级官员。从他很随意的赶走公安局的警察和我单独谈话来看，他的身份应该是真实的。从他谈完条件后要离开半小时，然后回来作答复来看，应该有更高级的官员在附近监听，并作出决定。
谈话一开始他就说明这是个谈判，有事情需要我帮忙。他说：我知道你和美国的国务卿约好了见面，也知道你的观点；我们无法改变你的观点，也不想改变你的观点；但是希望你不要和美国的国务卿见面。
我说不行。我既然和人家约好了见面，就不能不遵守诺言。
他说我们可以和你交换条件。“我们知道你要做的事情，你只要不和美国国务卿见面，我们可以答应你要做的事情。”
我说我不相信事情这么简单。为什么我见不见美国的国务卿就这么重要呢？为什么因此你们就可以答应你们一直都禁止我们做的事情呢？
他说，你可能不知道中美贸易对我们多么重要：除了那些虚假的数字之外，我们每年真正的利润有百分之七十来自对外贸易；而这其中的百分之七十来自对美国的贸易，因为美国的市场利润比较高。你们可能会认为搞掉对美国的利润我们就会垮台，这很正确，我要是你们我也会希望这样做。但是老百姓会因此倒霉，很多企业会破产。你很热爱老百姓，所以我们估计你会同意我们的条件。
我说不一定。我认为你们垮台并建立民主制度会对老百姓更有利。两害相权取其轻。而且将来老百姓的利益会得到更多的补偿。
他说你把问题说得太简单了。你也曾经是我们内部的人，不是不懂政治。你以为真的会闹到贸易制裁的地步吗？
我说为什么不会？
他说中美两国的利益决定了，即使贸易制裁也只会是短期的。两国的企业不会让它持续到你所需要的地步让我们垮台。
我说既然如此你们就没必要来和我谈判。你们也知道我是宁可蹲监狱也不会放弃原则的。
他说这个我们知道。我们比你那些同伙更了解你。但是也希望你能再仔细想一想，短期的制裁也要由人负责，现在的最高当局就会因此下台。这就是为什么有人想在你身上做文章的原因。这也是我们不得不保护你不出事的原因。
他又说：你可能笑我的谎话编得太低级，可我要告诉你这是实情。你现在处在中美关系的焦点上。你出了事，不管是真是假，这屎盆子就要扣在最高当局的头上。他下台了，其他人才能上来，所以有人急于利用你出事情来达到自己的目的。达到目的后，他们会很快和美国政府合作解决贸易问题。但是你就没机会达到你的目标了。这里边的利益你应该很清楚。
我说我还是不太相信你们的承诺，我还需要有保证。江泽民下台不一定是坏事，后边的人也不一定就不愿意向我们妥协。
他说你要做的几件事情我们都答应，你再考虑考虑。我现在出去有点事情，半小时后再回来。
他给我列好在一张纸上的条件，第一条就是释放政治犯，并且包括了三十五人的名单。其它三条也是我正要做的事情，即：组织工会；建立艺术家自己的公司；购买银行股份并帮助收转人道主义捐款。
一个多小时后这位自称郭姓的官员回来了，问我考虑得怎么样。
我说你们答应了没有用：组织工会要民政部批准；文化公司要文化部批准；购买银行股份要人民银行批准。这不是你们司法部门的权力范围，所以听上去就像是欺骗。
他说：我再重复一遍我是代表最高当局来和你谈判，这些都在我们的权限之内，到时候我会帮助你办好所有的手续。
我仍然表示难以相信。
他说这样吧：我们再加一条你可以看得见的条件，除了释放政治犯之外，在你不违反承诺的前提下，你的人我们一律不抓。他的意思是指所有民运人士。
我说最近抓了一些民运人士，不在你的名单上。这些人怎么办？
他说最近抓了的人还没有进入法律程序。你给我一天的时间，我把他们都放了。明天我们再决定你是否接受我们的条件。明天你可以打电话验证一下我们是否有能力遵守诺言。
第二天我给几个朋友打电话，证明那些被抓的确实被无条件也无任何解释地释放了。但我仍然犹豫着不准备接受他们的条件。
他显然很着急，有点失去控制地对我说：你要知道我们承受了很大的风险，我们也向党内作了解释。如果你还是不同意，我们只好把你抓起来。这样正好符合那一边的目的，你的那些条件也都告吹了。
接着他又补充说：美国人也不是你想象的那么可靠，最后和新上台的人达成妥协；到时候政治犯照抓，你的事情没一样能办成。你应该权衡一下厉害。把话说得再难听一些，即使我们将来后悔了，你至少可以得到释放政治犯的好处，另一派还不一定会给你这个好处呢。
到此我认为他的话可信度已经比较高了。于是接受了他们的条件，并且详细计划了我出外治疗，并婉转拒绝克里斯多夫国务卿。我认为我和国务卿见面肯定不会得到这些条件。而美国如果坚持关注中国的人权，也不会取消每年一度的最惠国待遇审查。
当时的条件里包括克里斯多夫国务卿离开北京后，我就可以返回北京继续从事我所希望的工作，以及他们执行剩下的条件。
三月二十九日我在济南时，他们通知我两件事：第一，我的刑期已经执行完毕，不再对我执行管制，恢复我的公民权。第二，美国国务卿已经离开中国，但事情有一些变化，希望我能够再到南方玩一段时间，一两个月之后再回北京。我拒绝了后一个要求，坚持按原有的条件立刻回北京。我认为这样可以验证他们是否有能力执行承诺。
两天后我进入天津到北京的高速公路。但是整个高速公路都已经被关闭了，其中只有我和朋友的车，和四辆包围我们的公安局的车。到达通县出口时，有一百多名警察堵住了我们，包括公安局的几个不同部门的人，还包括安全局和检察院的人。
一名熟悉的、多日来负责监视我的警察先过来对我说，现在的情况太复杂，他们也搞不清状况。他让我不要搞得太僵，他们正在背后做协调。之后，一名不认识的警察过来出示了传讯证。他们把我和正准备向我交接十亿元股票的商人，带到了通县的一个制造假古董的公司内。
睡到下午，我听到门口有熟悉的警察在和别人争吵。陌生的声音说：我们得到的指示不准任何方面单独和他见面。我熟悉的警察说：我们接到的上级指示是必须单独和他见面，你们无权旁听我们的谈话，这是你们的上级同意的。
然后他们打了电话。之后，熟悉的警察将我带到了外边的一家餐馆的单间，告诉我：克里斯多夫走后，党内的争论更加激烈。另一派不相信美国人，也不相信我没有影响美国人。他们坚持按共产党的专政理论处理我，不认为应该遵守协议条件，否则就是丧失了党性和原则。他们的上级正在处理这个矛盾，需要我再耐心一些。我说我不知道他们内部的事情，但我的耐心有时间限制。
到第三天我正式通知看守我的警察：按刑事诉讼法，传讯不能连续超过三天，除非他们能拿到逮捕证，否则我到晚上将自行离开。他们说你等着，我们马上去检察院拿逮捕证。
到晚上我问逮捕证拿到没有。他们回答说没有。检察院不给逮捕证。但是拿到了公安局出具的监视居住证，这个不需要检察院批准。我说监视居住是在自己家里而且不限制人身自由，只是不得脱离你们的监视。你们现在的措施就是非法拘禁。
他们笑着说你不要想钻我们的法律空子。我们的法律我们说了算，不能按你们的理解。虽说过去没有，现在就可以给你创造一个案例；而且因为没有进入法律程序，通知家属等等也就不用执行；你现在不享有法律规定的任何权利。从此开始了对我长达十八个月的非法拘禁，而且没有报纸和电视，没有和外界的任何联系。
就我事后得知的情况，至少到九五年夏天之前，有关释放政治犯和有关我的人不抓的承诺执行了大约一年。我认为这是解除贸易制裁不顺利的原因，也是美国人民仍然关心中国人权的原因。否则江泽民无法在中共的专政理论和贸易之间得到妥协。
从这个过程，我们可以了解到中共在谈判中的几个特点。
1） 他们只受利益的约束，不受承诺的约束。因为从根本上他们就不承认常识和道理，只承认他们的伟大理想。这和所有的邪教一样。据此可见陈光诚坚持留在中国是一个缺乏常识的错误判断。而美国政府没有帮助他了解这个常识，给自己带来了之后的麻烦。
2） 中国政府不是一个整体。而是不同的利益集团。他们之间的斗争缺乏规矩，国家利益也经常成为他们之间谈判的筹码。某一派的承诺经常成为其它派别攻击的目标。不遵守协议是经常的事情。美国政府在没有保障的情况下相信某一派别的承诺，是犯了政治判断的错误。
3） 把人质扣在手中再进行谈判，是中共进行谈判的传统。在他们的意识形态里，不择手段争取最大利益，是对付被认为不符合他们理想的人们的正当手段。为了利益可以不择手段，这是他们的正式的理论。把陈光诚交回到中国警察手里，再一次犯了政治判断的错误。美国将为此付出额外的代价。
魏京生在美国国会作证的照片：
http://www.weijingsheng.org/pic/newsletters/newsletters2012/newsletters2012-2/WeiJStestifies120515inCongress.jpg
2012年5月15日国会听证会现场：
http://www.weijingsheng.org/pic/newsletters/newsletters2012/newsletters2012-2/Congress120515hearing.jpg
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