Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A969-W622

魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A969-W622

Release Date: November 19, 2016

发布日：2016年11月19日

Topic: The Coup of Deng Xiaoping and Beyond -- Wei Jingsheng

标题：从邓小平的政变说起 -- 魏京生

Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)

此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）

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The Coup of Deng Xiaoping and Beyond

-- Wei Jingsheng

Since I was young, I have enjoyed studying history. I received guidance from many old gentlemen scholars. One of them liked me so much and wanted to recruit me as a graduate student. But wrong courses of the history resulted in me being unable to enter the graduate school. Instead, I unexpectedly participated in the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement in China, and then expectedly entered the prison.

Although I lost my opportunity to enter the graduate school due a "back door" acceptance of a different student personally approved by Deng Xiaoping, that was not related to the fact that I opposed Deng's policy. Deng Xiaoping also did not expect to create an enemy to his own; although it was unintentional. As many of these old gentlemen scholars told me later: What a pity, if you had become our graduate student, then you would not have to spend more than a decade in prison.

But I think it was more important to raise my arms in a call for democracy and freedom for China, than to become a graduate student. Who can have this opportunity of life to carry out his loyalty for the people? So I should thank Deng Xiaoping for opening the "back door" to squeeze me out of graduate school. Otherwise it would not have met the needs of history. History is filled with these contingent yet interrelated events. It was not an accident for me to criticize Deng Xiaoping during the 1978 Democracy Wall period. That was because I had a long-term observation of politics and found out that Deng's machinations would be successful. I could not bear that and thus jumped out and spoke out with my own life on line.

Even nowadays, very few people have talked about Deng Xiaoping's coup which replaced Hua Guofeng. Even fewer people think that Deng Xiaoping had an even greater plot. However, the Democracy Wall movement reminded many senior Communist cadres who had just released from prison at that time to be wary. Thus Deng Xiaoping's ambitions to be the second Mao Zedong were unsuccessful. Even these senior Communist cadres did not want to suffer a second time as they had during the Mao Zedong era, and they did not want to see another Mao Zedong.

However, Deng Xiaoping did a great job and had a successful of coup d'etat by groveling and receding. His actions can be used as a model for people today. The experience can be said to be a lesson. As Mao Zedong once said, the historical experience is worth noting.

At that time, the situation was like this: even before his death, Mao Zedong already had a judgment of Deng Xiaoping as not a person who would behave himself and inevitably would be a fatal threat to the continuity of Mao Zedong's line of policies. Thus Mao empowered Hua Guofeng, who had a public opinion of being well behaved, with enough power that was sufficient to subdue the authority of Deng Xiaoping and other senior Communist cadres. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who were difficult to subdue, had already died before Mao Zedong. Thus according to Mao's plan, after he finished his full term, Hua Guofeng should have smoothly transferred power to Jiang Qing, wife of Mao Zedong, and other cronies of Mao.

Unfortunately, Hua Guofeng was not able to tolerate Jiang Qing's domineering as people had imagined, and Wang Dongxing (Mao's principal bodyguard and one of the decision makers making the arrest of the Gang of Four headed by Jiang Qing) could tolerate her even less. This time Mao made an error in his judgment. He had many errors of judgment in his life, yet was able to remedy them. However, he could not remedy this one when he was already dead.

Thus came the opportunity for Deng Xiaoping. Originally, Mao Zedong calculated that it was impossible for Deng Xiaoping to fight against Jiang Qing's Gang of Four after Deng lost his power. But Mao did not expect that Hua Guofeng would turn against her; thus the opportunity for Deng Xiaoping arrived. But Deng Xiaoping did not act rashly, because both Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing were not fools. Of course both Hua and Wang maintained vigilance against careerists within the Communist leadership who had strength. Deng Xiaoping adopted a strategy of groveling and receding. This was similar to his strategy of "hide our capabilities and bide our time" to the international society after Deng took over the power.

Deng Xiaoping adopted the same strategy that he did after Lin Biao's failed coup. Just as he wrote to express his allegiance to Chairman Mao after Lin Biao's coup, this time, he wrote to Chairman Hua to express his allegiance, and even said to continue the movement to criticize Deng Xiaoping and counterattack right-leaning political overturn winds, etc. This not very clever trick actually made Hua Guofeng believe in him. So later on people have thought Hua Guofeng was really stupid, or too "well behaved". This kind of evaluation after the fact is not really sound, because they did not take into account that when one's status soars, one's confidence will overflow as well. Hua Guofeng certainly believed that even if Deng Xiaoping played tricks, he could not win over Chairman Hua himself who had the power.

But Hua Guofeng was wrong. After Deng Xiaoping resumed his job, he actively contacted senior Communist cadres. Deng used Mao Zedong's consistent approach, which was to make a hit after all the hidden preparation which ensured the hit to be correctly aimed. This was the tested magic of Mao Zedong during his internal struggle within the Communist leadership. Deng Xiaoping had finally learned the essence after suffering repeated losses.

Yet, just the use of these tactics was not enough to fight against the monopoly power of Hua Guofeng. The most important addition was that Deng Xiaoping made good use of Hua's mistake. Hua Guofeng was flattered to believe that people supported him, instead of his representation of the non-Mao Zedong tendency. So he continued adherence to Mao's line, which became the best reason for people to oppose him. Deng Xiaoping wisely used this. He quickly organized an anti-Hua Guofeng alliance, and grabbed the real power into his own hands.

But after he grabbed the power, Deng Xiaoping did not reform the model of Mao Zedong. We can see that he still insisted on his old communist dictatorship. Deng Xiaoping quickly did two things. First, he visited the United States to prove that he was stronger than Hua Guofeng in diplomacy, while gaining the support of the United States. Second, he immediately launched a war against Vietnam, thus increasing his prestige and warned the opponents within the Communist leadership that the army was in the hands of Deng Xiaoping. This was the same approach of Mao Zedong during the early days of the Communist regime, which was clearly a road to dictatorship. So I warned all the people that Deng Xiaoping was engaged in a new dictatorship.

Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping did not become a true dictator. That was not because he did not have the desire to be a dictator, but because he could not be one. All the people of the whole China wanted to change the model of Mao Zedong. The strong pressure from the people of insight within the Communist Party and in the Chinese society forced him to go against his own will, and to reform both politically and the economically. Within the Communist leadership, Deng had a difficulty to lead, thus had to carry out the so-called democracy within the Communist Party with a collective responsibility system. He also encountered difficulties outside of the central government, thus he had to implementing the economic reform which already had broken through in the provinces despite suppression. To call Deng Xiaoping as "the chief designer of the economic reform" in China, is a wrongful way to treat Deng Xiaoping, very wrong.

But Deng was a smart man. As a compromise, he tolerated the so-called democracy within the Communist leadership, but kept one-party dictatorship. Another compromise he made was to open a half-baked market economy to ensure a short-term economic growth, but did not give up the monopoly of state-owned economy. Today, Xi Jinping is not that smart. Xi Jinping is opposing the aspirations of the entire Chinese people, in an attempt to restore autocratic monopoly and monopolistic economy of the Mao Zedong era. Not only the people of the country, but also the people of insight within the Communist leadership can see: Xi Jinping's reverse action provides the right opportunity to these ambitious politicians.

To hear Mr. Wei Jingsheng's related commentary, please visit:

http://www.weijingsheng.org/RFA/RFA2016/WeiJS161011onDengXPcoup.mp3

(Written and recorded on October 11, 2016. Broadcasted by Radio Free Asia.)

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中文版

Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A969-W622

魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A969-W622

Release Date: November 19, 2016

发布日：2016年11月19日

Topic: The Coup of Deng Xiaoping and Beyond -- Wei Jingsheng

标题：从邓小平的政变说起 -- 魏京生

Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)

此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）

如有中文乱码问题，请与我们联系或访问:

http://www.weijingsheng.org/report/report2016/report2016-11/WeiJS161119onDengXPcoupA969-W622.htm

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从邓小平的政变说起

-- 魏京生

我从年轻的时候起，就喜欢研究历史。我得到了不止一位老先生的指导。一位老先生曾十分中意，非要招收我为研究生。但阴差阳错，我没有就读，反而意外地参加了民主墙运动，然后不意外地进了监狱。

虽然我没能就读研究生和邓小平亲自批准的走后门有关，但我反对他的政策却和这件事无关。他也没想到给自己制造了一个敌人，虽然也是无意之间的事儿。正如许多老先生说得那样：真可惜，你如果来所里当研究生，也就不用蹲那十几年的监狱了。

可我倒觉得，为中国的民主自由振臂一呼，比当个研究生更重要。谁一辈子能有这个机会为老百姓尽忠呢？所以还得感谢老邓把我给后门掉了。否则就不符合历史的需要了。历史充满了这种偶然而又互相关联的事件。在1978年的民主墙时期我就批评了邓小平，也不是偶然的。而是因为我长期观察政治，发现邓小平的阴谋诡计将要得逞，忍无可忍才跳出来以死相拼。

至今很少人谈论邓小平取代华国锋是一场政变，更少有人认为邓小平怀有更大的阴谋。但是，民主墙运动提醒了很多刚从监狱里放出来的老共产党，邓小平当毛泽东二世的野心才没有成功。就是共产党的高级干部，也不想吃二遍苦，受二茬罪，谁也不想再来一个毛泽东了。

但是邓小平卧薪尝胆，卑辞折节最终成功地政变上台，的确干得十分成功。这可以作为今人借鉴的典范。其中的经验也可以说是教训。正如毛泽东说过的那样，历史的经验值得注意。

当时的形势是这样的：毛泽东去世之前已经判断邓小平不是个安分守己的人，必然会对继续毛泽东的路线构成致命的威胁，所以他换上了大家都认为很老实的华国锋，并给了华国锋足以制服邓小平和一干老干部的权威。而不好制服的周恩来和朱德已经在毛之前去世了，按计划华国锋应该在干满任期后顺利地把权力移交给毛的夫人江青和毛的亲信们。

遗憾的是华国锋并不像人们想象的那样能够容忍江青的飞扬跋扈，汪东兴更不能容忍。这种关系的确是老毛看走了眼，他一生中很多次看走了眼，但都有能力补救。可这一次他没有这个能力了，人死灯灭管不了身后事了。

这时候邓小平的机会来了。本来毛泽东算计邓小平在失去权力之后，不可能斗得过江青等四人帮。可是他没算计到华国锋其实不那么老实，这样邓小平的机会就来了。但邓小平没有轻举妄动，因为华国锋和汪东兴都不是草包，他们对党内有实力的野心家必然保持了警惕性。邓小平采取的是卑辞折节，卧薪尝胆的策略。和他当权后对国际社会的韬光养晦有异曲同工之处。

邓小平采取了和林彪事件后同样的策略，给主席写信效忠，甚至说要继续批邓，反击右倾翻案风。这种不十分高明的伎俩居然让华国锋信以为真。所以事后人们认为华国锋确实很傻，或者说太老实。这种事后诸葛亮其实没什么道理，因为他们没考虑到地位飙升会使得人的信心爆棚。华国锋肯定认为邓小平即使玩花样，也逃不出他华主席的如来佛手掌心。

但老华错了。邓小平恢复工作后，就积极联络老干部。他采用毛泽东的一贯手法，私下里串联之后才摆到台面上来，保证一击而中。这是毛泽东在党内斗争中屡试不爽的法宝。邓小平在屡次吃亏之后终于学到了精髓。

但仅仅手法还不足以对抗华国锋的大权独揽。最重要的是邓小平很好地利用了华国锋的错误。华国锋飘飘然地以为人们支持的是他本人，而不是因为他代表非毛化的倾向。所以他继续坚持毛的路线，就成为人们可能反对他的最好理由。邓小平明智地利用了这一点。他很快就组织起反华国锋的联盟，并把实权掌握在自己的手里。

掌权后的邓小平并没有改革毛泽东的模式，从这里我们可以看出他仍然坚持他们老共产党的那套独裁专制的路子。他很快地做了两件事。第一，访问美国来证明他在外交上比华国锋强，同时获得了美国的支持。第二，他立即发动了对越南的战争，提高了自己的威望并警告党内对手，军队在他邓小平的手里。这和毛泽东在建国初期的手法如出一辙，是很明显的走向独裁的道路。因此我警告所有的人，邓小平要搞的是新的独裁。

之后他终于没有成为真正的独裁者，并不是他邓小平的愿望，而是不得已。全国人民都想要改变毛泽东的模式，党内的和社会上的有识之士形成强大的压力，迫使他违背自己的愿望，不得不在政治和经济两个模式上改革。党内他摆不平，只得实行所谓的党内民主，集体负责制。党外他摆不平，只得实行在各省已经压不住而获得突破的经济改革。说他是总设计师，那可真的是在冤枉他，比窦娥还冤。

不过邓小平还是个聪明人，作为妥协他容忍了所谓的党内民主，但保留了一党专政。作为妥协他开放了半吊子市场经济，保证了短期内的经济增长，但没有放弃国营经济的垄断地位。如今的习近平可没有这么聪明。他正在和全中国人民的愿望对着干，企图恢复毛泽东时代的独裁专制和垄断性经济。不要说全国人民了，就是党内的有识之士也能看出来：习近平的倒行逆施，正是野心勃勃的政治家们的机会。