Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A1622-W1181
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A1622-W1181
Release Date: December 9, 2023
发布日：2023年12月9日
Topic: ‘Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes’ -- Xu Zhangrun (Translated and
noted by Professor Geremie R. Barmé)
标题：我們當下的恐懼與期待
– 许章润教授（白杰明教授翻译英文并注释）
Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)
此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）
Note: Please use "Simplified Chinese (GB2312)" encoding to
view the Chinese parts of this release.
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‘Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes’
-- Xu Zhangrun (Translated and
noted by Professor Geremie R. Barmé)
Note by the editor at the Wei Jingsheng Foundation:
On 5 December 2023, the Wei Jingsheng Foundation announced that
Professor XU Zhangrun had been awarded the Twentieth Annual Wei Jingsheng Chinese
Democracy Champion Prize:
This news spread fast and was relayed by different media include the
China Heritage by the well-known sinologist Geremier Barme:
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/an-award-for-professor-xu-zhangrun/
which has an outstanding archive on Professor Xu
Zhangrun at:
https://chinaheritage.net/?s=zhangrun
According to Professor Barme, Professor Xu Zhangrun remains under
constant surveillance in the western suburbs of Beijing. Despite his isolation, it was possible to
communicate the details of this award to him.
Humbled and touched by this recognition, Professor Xu requested that the
prize money attached to the award be used to support the operations of the Wei
Jingsheng Foundation. The Wei Jingsheng
Foundation is very grateful to Professor Xu and will honor his request. We are also grateful to Professor Barme for
this information.
Below is Professor Xu’s writing “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes — A
Beijing Jeremiad” on July 24, 2018, that is beautifully translated by Professor
Barme:
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/imminent-fears-immediate-hopes-a-beijing-jeremiad/
We are publishing this note to honor Professor Xu, as well as with a
great appreciation to Professor Barme for his permission to use his
translation.
Thank you all for your attention!
__ __ __
‘Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes’
-- Xu Zhangrun
Translated, with Notes and Elaborations, by Geremie R. Barmé
Yet again people throughout China — including the entire bureaucratic
class — are suffering from uncertainty and they are experiencing a mounting
sense of anxiety in relation both to the direction the country is taking as
well as in regard to their personal security. These anxieties have generated
something of a nationwide panic. This is primarily due to the fact that in
recent years our National Orientation has betrayed the Basic Principles that I
outline below. In fact, we now seem to be heading in the opposite direction
from the one that we have previously been taking. In my opinion, these Basic
Principles should not be compromised, and under no circumstances should they be
undermined. For these are the Principles that inform the policies formulated by
the Communist Party following the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and during the long
years over which it slowly and painstakingly regained a measure of political
legitimacy. Throughout the three decades of the Open Door and Reform era
[c.1978-2008], these Principles proved to be the most appropriate political
approach; they also reflected the substantive consensus arrived at by the
entire populace on the basis of which the country could henceforth enjoy a form
of peaceful co-existence. Under no circumstance should they be called into
question or undermined.
***
1. Four Basic Principles
So, then, what are the Four Basic Principles?
The First Basic Principle:
Security and Stability
The present system has enjoyed a measure of legitimacy because it has
been able to ensure that our society has enjoyed basic security and stability.
And, that is why, in the wake of the Catastrophe [of Mao’s rule and the
Cultural Revolution] hundreds of millions of Chinese have supported the
Communist Party’s policies of Economic Reform and the Open Door for nigh on
four decades.
What is required now is ongoing social order and a clear vision for the
nation’s future. That is why it is imperative that the government abandon its
obsession with ever-new ‘Political Movements.’ This includes putting an end to
the repeated cycles of ‘Strike Hard’ campaigns [that have been launched
variously in 1983,1996, 2001 and 2010] in the name of targeting criminals and
underworld gangs. It is important [for the government] to confront increasing
signs of social anomie and maintain social order, while at the same time
promoting substantive social reconciliation. Only by so doing can the
party-state vouchsafe a level of social normalcy that will enable the Common
People to go about their daily business.
Admittedly, such public goods, as ensured by the government, have a
legitimate role to play; indeed, they are essential if the state is to respond
to the broad spectrum of needs that constitute normal life, such as:
fundamental social order, a fair society, adequate employment opportunities, as
well as vouchsafing people’s right to live with dignity. It is inevitable that,
with the passage of time and in light of changing circumstances, people’s
aspirations are bound to evolve. In the absence of ‘high-tier public products’
[that is, freedom of expression and an independent judiciary, let alone a
meaningful democratic system], the people of China, who have experienced so
much turmoil and suffering in the past, require minimum, base-line guarantees
of personal safety and social stability.
Generally in years past the Basic Principle of Security has been
assured and even seen as being desirable. After all, people just want to have a
peaceful life, make enough for food and clothing and enjoy a measure of
prosperity. All of these are premised on individuals being able to live in a
functioning and reasonable society. Nonetheless, the kind of stable environment
[that we actually have] and the ‘Stability Maintenance’ policies that have been
developed to ensure it have generated problems of their own, revealing their
own limitations in the process. In fact, they have produced deadly lesions
throughout society that threaten the political legitimacy [of the party-state]
itself.
Moreover, for over three decades, in particular following [Deng
Xiaoping’s Tour of the South, during which he re-invigorated the process of
economic reforms that had stalled following 4 June 1989 and become bogged down
in the ideological squabbles that ensued, in] the spring-summer of 1992, the
ruling Communist Party has pursued economic growth. Or, as the official formula
puts it: ‘Devoted Itself to Development and Focussed Its Energies on
Construction’. Such a policy was pursued for twenty years and for the most part
it enjoyed the active support of officialdom and the wider society. Despite a
few clashes over the years, the average Chinese began to feel that, no matter
who was in power, or who fell from grace, given the orderly succession of
bureaucrats, the country as a whole would be able to continue focussing on
substantive efforts of nation building.
When it came down to it, most people were willing enough to put up with
the existing political arrangements. In other words: ‘You hold onto the reins
of power; and just let me get on with enjoying my life’. This official-popular
consensus resulted in an overall environment of social stability and security
that I have been discussing here. That’s to say, people’s aspirations have not
been really about ‘This Dream’ or ‘That Dream’, rather they have been concerned
with growing the economy and developing a society that supports longterm nation
building. The sentiment can be summed up simply as: ‘Don’t launch any more
political campaigns; let us continue to have a peaceful life.’ This Basic
Principle is the starting point for the [generally held] view that overall [the
power-holders] were fulfilling their moral duty [to the people]. And it has
been on this basis that the vast majority of Chinese people have accepted Your
Rule.
The Second Basic Principle:
A Measure of Respect for Property Rights
Respecting private property and tolerating the desire of people to
pursue wealth creation is the Second Basic Principle.
We went from a time when private property and ownership were regarded
as the source of all social evils [during the era of ‘High Maoism’, from 1956
to 1976] and entered a period that tolerated hundreds of millions of Chinese
legitimately pursuing greater personal wealth, and then on to a time when there
was the prospect that property rights would even be recognised constitutionally
— or as the common short-hand expression puts it, ‘private property would be allowed into [recognised by] the
Constitution’.
This new approach liberated the natural propensity of people to seek
the ways and means to achieve prosperity for themselves and their families. The
politics of China [finally] embraced the natural human desire for a better
life. As a result, not only did the State enjoy massive economic growth it also
became possible to allocate appropriate funding for Science and Technology,
Education, Culture, National Defense and the Military. Importantly [for the
Power-Holders], it crucially underwrote the massive expenditures of the
Party-State itself. Of course, average Chinese benefited as standards of living
improved. This is the legal and legitimate basis upon which China has enjoyed
such rapid development; it is also the underlying economic rationale behind why
the existing political legitimacy [of the regime] has been tolerated by
All-of-China. After all, this is what people regard as fundamental: Touch
whatever you must, just leave our wallets alone. This is a principle
universally accepted by humanity at large for, in the modern era, the idea of
private property is wedded to the concept of human nature.
After [the Party implemented a raft of policies in the late 1970s in
the wake of the Cultural Revolution as a result of which] ‘Wrongs
were Righted and Order replaced Chaos’ China was
converted and able to take up once more the journey along the Broad Way of
Universal Human Existence. And, lo and behold!: ‘Verily, There is No Greater
Virtue than to Realise the Error of Your Ways’.
The Third Basic Principle:
A Measure of Tolerance of Personal Freedoms
Over the past decades, civil society has not evolved in China. Whenever
there’s been an outbreak of anything approaching normalcy, it has been crushed.
This has had a profoundly negative impact on the individual growth and
political maturation of our citizenry. Politically speaking, at present things
are dire and, as a result, the Chinese Nation as a whole continues to be
seriously diminished. Regardless, personal ethics have, by and large, enjoyed a
considerable revival; in the economic and private realms there has even been a
measure of positive growth.
Today, although people can enjoy various liberties of social actors
they do not have full rights as citizens; this is particularly so in the case
of the more economically advanced provinces and it has been so for quite some
time. What I mean by ‘the liberties of social actors’ is that in the private
sphere people can enjoy limited personal freedoms, in particular in relation to
such everyday pleasures as eating out, going about one’s daily business and
personal intimacy behind closed doors. There is also a certain latitude
permitted when it comes to a range of individual choices that have no immediate
political dimension. For example, if nothing else, people don’t have to be
worried about official invigilators interfering with their hairstyles or
fashion choices [as they did for years from 1966]. You can also enjoy massage
parlors and public baths, travel freely, eat yourself silly and even indulge in
extra-marital affairs [Note: the tone of these remarks is, to put it mildly,
‘male-centric’]. It’s all very comfy and petit-bourgeois.
People have for some time been able to enjoy a general sense of social
normalcy and everyday ease. Given the brutal monotony of the Maoist years when
everyone had to be careful to keep it in their pants, you can’t be all that
critical that these days people prefer settling for everyday pleasures rather
than perilously demanding their true rights as citizens. Again, this [relative
non-interference in the private sphere] is a major contributing factor to why
people are willing to tolerate the political status quo.
It is in this context that we should nonetheless note how the police
use the pretext of, say, cracking down on prostitution to target certain
individuals [as in the case of the environmental activist Lei Yang who died in
custody after being detained by the police for allegedly soliciting a
prostitute at a foot-massage parlor in Beijing in May 2016. Note: In July 2020,
Xu himself was detained for a week on supposedly for ‘soliciting prostitutes’
while on a trip to Sichuan in late 2019]. This kind of policing contributes to
an overall atmosphere of paranoia. Although you might think you’ve achieved
what you want in one particular case, [since these stories are reported both in
the official and the unofficial media] you actually end up undermining people’s
general sense of personal security. In other words, you lose more than you
gain.
Or take the policy to clean up Beijing [launched by Cai Qi, mayor of
Beijing and one of Xi Jinping’s protégés, in late 2017, ostensibly aimed at ‘urban
renewal’, but for all intents and purposes it was a putsch
against what was derisively referred to as the city’s ‘low-end population’ of itinerant
workers and their families]. The forced closure and destruction of small shops,
convenience stores and bars was a typical example of ‘Vanity
Politics’ [that is, political actions that are more for
show than practical effect; policies that are aimed either at pleasing other
bureaucrats or at currying favour with one’s superiors] that allowed the
Authority to demonstrate His power over the common mass and to impose an
‘aesthetics of suffering’ in the process. — Don’t urban planners in
international metropolises like Hong Kong, London and Paris allow spaces for
open-air trading and business as a matter of course?
In a market economy, people all too readily despise poverty, but they
tolerate prostitution; some even chose to amuse themselves to death. There are
people who might put on a big show and come across all coy, yet [behind closed
doors] they indulge in the boundless possibilities afforded to them by their
obscene wealth; they do so in the most immoral, mindless and shameless fashion.
Very well, [we admit that] such debauched phenomena are the price one pays for
the existence of a consumer society. In the eyes of ordinary people who enjoy a
quotidian existence, such things are part and parcel of what could be called
the ‘modern comedy’ — or even the ‘post-modern farce’. The majority of people
have no choice but to live according to the logic of the market, one that has
turned everything into a commodity.
The Fourth Basic Principle:
Maintaining Term Limits for Political Appointees
Despite the fact that there seemed to be evidence of a modicum of
social pluralism and a measure of political tolerance, over the past three
decades China has in reality seen no substantial political reform. The Chinese
Party-State is essentially founded on dictatorial political principles which at
their rotten core are bolstered by a philosophy of pitiless struggle and
factional infighting. On the surface, this would appear to be a political
modality whose ugly maw can only be sated by ruling over and consuming the
wealth of the nation. However, due to a Constitutional Provision [introduced
following Mao’s death and in consideration of the depredations resulting from
his lifelong tenure as Party Chairman] that limited the highest power-holders
to two five-year terms in office — and that includes both the state president
and the premier — since 2003 [when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to power], and
with the peaceful transition of leadership [from Jiang Zemin, who was
personally appointed to lead the party-state by Deng Xiaoping following the
ouster of his predecessor Zhao Ziyang following the Beijing Massacre on 4 June
1989], the country finally got to enjoy ten years [2003 to 2012] during which
the leaders actually seemed to be satisfied with two five-year terms in power.
Finally, it was as though we were coming to think of that situation [involving
the regularisation and peaceful transition of political power] as akin to a
‘constitutional convention’.
For once, it was as though the Law and our Reality were in sync; it
appeared that, finally, we might now be able to advance along a set path [of
regular political turn-over]. This situation afforded the Chinese people a
measure of political certainty and it bolstered international confidence in
China as our country looked as if it was on the way to becoming a modern
polity.
Here we should emphasise that this point, and this alone, has been the
only tangible instance of substantive political reform and progress in China
over the past thirty-five years. Regardless of all that vacuous hoopla about
various other kinds of political reform initiatives, China’s Party-State system
had otherwise remained immobile.
So, everyone came to believe that now, no matter who you are or what
you do [that is, regardless of how bad or incompetent Party and State leaders
might prove to be], at the most you’ll only be in power for ten years. For the
blameless masses of Chinese — they who are as humble and as numerous as ants,
the people who till the yellow earth tirelessly, their sweaty backs bent
beneath the sky, those who live laboring to the end of their days just to keep
their families fed, people who are absolutely powerless to resist the might of
a highly organised state machine — now, finally, they had [come to
appreciate the concept of] a ‘ten-year
rule’. There actually seemed as though a [quasi-legal] measure had been
instituted that would prevent the outbreak of yet another period of political
instability [resulting from a succession crisis within the Communist Party
leadership]. Finally, the Masses could go about their everyday lives with one
less thing to worry about.
In Summation:
Reviewing the above, it is evident that social control based on the
maintenance of public order, something that overall is a public good, is still
effective. However, in its expansion to become a system of ‘Stability
Maintenance’ the methods that are now employed to achieve social control have
in effect put entire areas of the country under quasi-martial law [in
particular, the Tibetan and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions in West
China and, from 2020, Hong Kong]. This system has become unwieldy and
economically unviable. I would argue that this is evidence that this approach
to dealing with public order has exhausted its potential and that it is in
urgent need of renovation and upgrading.
The recent Sino-US Trade War has, in particular, revealed the
underlying weaknesses and the soft underbelly of the Party-State system. This
has served to fuel further the widespread sense of insecurity in the society at
large. Prior to this, at a high-level meeting [of The Chinese Communist Party
in Dialogue with World Political Parties from 30 November to 3 December 2017],
our Highest Authority declared that ‘political
legitimacy cannot be fixed at once [neither can it be taken for granted]’. This
seemed to indicate that the Concerned Authority [that is, Xi Jinping] is indeed
aware of a legitimacy crisis. However, more recently there has been a definite
lack of sensitivity in regard to this issue coupled with a tendency towards
overweening self-confidence. This [attitude] has found expression in such
things as the Party’s anti-poverty programs which approach policy issues by
using dated methods from the era of old-style mass mobilisation campaigns
[which pursued short-term political goals at great cost but for scant long-term
benefit]. This undermines confidence in policy continuity and sustainability.
The limited protection of property rights, along with a basic tolerance
of people devoting themselves to getting rich, has without doubt contributed to
economic growth and enhanced the living standards of countless Chinese. But
[over the last decade], both of these things have come up against policies that
allow the ‘State to Advance while the Private Sector is
Forced to Retreat’ [that is policies aimed at
protecting state-owned enterprises (SOEs), not on the basis of fiscal
viability, but rather to guarantee the political role and power of official
ideology and the cadre-ocracy. These policies became more prevalent during and
after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2010 and calls for the reform of SOEs
as part of a push for China’s further economic transformation had for years
been common among reform-minded economists, business leaders and thinkers].
In the private sector, people have also witnessed repeated cases of
official rapaciousness and the [state-sanctioned] plundering of private
property and wealth. As a reaction, people have increasingly urged the
government to ensure the ‘Sanctity of Private Property’.
There is now a public awareness that the logic lurking behind all of this is
that ‘Power Cannot be Privately Held and Property
Should Not Be Public’ [a line devised by the economist
Mao Yushi which was inspired by the ideas of John Locke]. It should be the case
that the division between the public and the private are regarded as the basis
for enduring social peace, for both are intrinsic to the politics of the past
and of the present. Only if China manages to work through this stage [of
conflict between the public and private realms] will there be true peace in our
country. However, in recent times people have been both pointedly critical and
fearful of the significance of the revisions made to the Chinese Constitution
[in March 2018] which included the abandonment of term limits on political
leaders [a move that, in effect, opened the way for State President/ General
Secretary/ Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping potential to enjoy lifelong
tenure in power]. There is a widespread feeling that this move actually
signifies the negation of the last thirty years of the Economic Reform and Open
Door policies. People fear that, in one fell swoop, China will be cast back to
the terrifying days of [one-man rule under] Mao. We have witnessed along with
this Constitutional revision a rising clamour related to the manufacturing of a
personality cult [for Xi Jinping], something that has in particular provoked
the Imminent Fears that I outline in the following.
***
2. Eight Imminent Fears
Below I offer an overview of the major causes of anxiety and panic in
contemporary China, arranged under eight topics.
Fear One: Property Tremens
Is anyone certain that they will be able to protect the personal wealth
that they have amassed over the past few decades, regardless of the amount?
Will they be able to maintain their standard of living? Will property rights as
outlined by the law really prove to be protected under the relevant
legislation? Will you be bankrupted or your family destroyed if you happen to
fall foul of one of the Power-Holders (a stratum that includes bureaucrats as
low down as the Committee Head of a village)?
Over time, especially in the past few years, people have become less
certain about the answers to these questions and this has contributed to a
widespread sense of panic at all levels of society. Those with the greatest
concerns are the people who ‘Got Rich First’, during the initial wave of
economic reforms [in the 1980s]. In many cases, these wealthy individuals have
responded by immigrating. As for average members of the middle class, even
though they don’t have to worry about being able to cover such basic
necessities as food and clothing — in fact, they enjoy a surplus of both — like
everyone else who is just trying to live a normal life, they are now fearful of
the unexpected. In particular, they worry both about inflation and devaluation;
either way their money could end up being worthless.
The wealthy immigrate for a host of different reasons: some do so in
pursuit of a better quality of life; others slip away to launder money; while
members of the Party nomenklatura want to put themselves beyond the reach of
the law. The most common reason that people have for immigrating is that they
are worried about the safety and
security of their private wealth.
Overall, the greatest winners in the decades of the Economic Reforms
and Open Door have been a particular [and peculiar] stratum: the Party
bureaucrat-cum business tycoon. They have milked the system with consummate
skill and, in recent years, they have made up the lion’s share of the migrating
uber-wealthy. The official media carefully limits information [about all of
this], but popular grumbling is widespread; added to that, the propagandists
still time and again strum the old tune about ‘the ultimate goal of Communism
being the abolition of private property’ to which hysterical populists add [the
old early revolutionary slogan] ‘Overthrow the Wealthy, Divide the Spoils’. Such
[mixed messages] simply exacerbate the sense of anxiety [among property
owners].
In the midst of all this widespread sense of anxiety it was been truly
breathtaking to witness the Pinnacle [that is the members of the ruling
Communist Party’s Politburo] sitting themselves down for a collective study
session devoted to The Communist Manifesto. [On 23 April 2018, the fifth
collective study session of the Politburo elected by the Nineteenth Party
Congress the previous October devoted itself to this topic.] It’s only here and
now in China that a dazzling work written by two wildly talented young authors
[Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels], one that completely unsettled the status quo
of its day, can truly be appreciated as it both explains things and profoundly
disrupts the equanimity of just about everyone in our nation.
Fear Two: Putting Politics Back in Command
[For the Authorities] To emphasise yet again policies that effectively ‘Put Politics in Command’ [a Mao-era
strategy dating from the Great Leap forward in 1958 that required the nation to
orient itself entirely according to Party policies; this strategy was put in
practice by means of mass political movements and class-based purges] and
abandon the Fundamental National Policy [of economic reform] in favour of
developing the economy is what I mean by Fear Two.
In recent years, the gunpowder stench of militant ideology has become
stronger. It reeks of what is [fashionably termed] ‘Taking the Lead to Achieve
Discursive Hegemony’ [that is, the right of the voices of those in power to
shout down all others], although in reality it is a perverse use of the public
to impose ideological punishment [on private citizens]. This has already led to
the intellectual world of China experiencing a sense of universal dread. Given
this situation, coupled with an ever-increasing emphasis on Self-Criticism
[that is, formulaic rituals in the work place during which people are pressured
to reveal openly and critique what are deemed to be private failings and then
pretend to measure all of one’s thoughts, words and deeds against the Party’s
ever-changing ideological catechism], the publishing industry has already
experienced severe contractions and the silencing of the media more generally
is becoming more serious by the day. This state of affairs is also increasingly
hindering exchanges between China and the outside world. We are even seeing
examples of official propaganda in which children are encouraged to report on
their parents, a flagrant violation of normal familial and ethical relations.
Such an approach that puts politics over everything else is a betrayal both of
our traditions and of our present aspirations. In this day and age one would
have thought this to be unthinkable; confronted by such a vile totalitarian
visage, however, one cannot help but recall the barbarism of the Cultural
Revolution.
The influence of such propaganda is seeping throughout the society.
Even some university lecturers have been singled out and repeatedly punished
for what they say [in lectures]. Many now live in trepidation, ever fearful
that Party ideological watchdogs [in their institutions] or Student Spies will
report them. Even more serious is the fact that local bureaucrats, afraid of
being accused of political wrongdoing, are frightened into passivity. In
reality, China’s economic development is dependent on the political engagement
and achievements of just such local cadres, men and women who are dedicated to
and believe in the strategy of development. While over there the remnants of
the ‘Chongqing Model’ [promoted
by Bo Xilai, former Party chief of Chongqing who in 2011-2012 was in
competition with Xi Jinping to lead the Party and eventually subsumed by Xi’s
own gimcrack policies, was a socio-political formula that encouraged political
revanchism in tandem with harsh policing as part of a strategy to mobilise, manipulate
and control the population] are working hand-in-glove with the ‘Three Types of People’ [a term that
denotes the various opportunists active in the Cultural Revolution era: Red
Guard Rebels, Factional Opportunists and Violent Thugs and Thieves — although these categories of extremists were denounced by
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, in many cases they went unpunished for their
misdeeds] in the tertiary education sector. With a sleight of hand and
consummate skill they have become a burgeoning force that disguises itself as a
form of ‘New Leftism’, and they are baying for blood.
Painful memories of ‘political movements’ still linger in the minds of
the average citizen [of a certain age]. Younger people are engrossed in urban
life and have long become accustomed to a modicum of economic comfort. They
have absolutely no interest in or awareness of the lurking totalitarian
tendencies undergirded by the illogicality of the Communist Party’s new push to
‘Put Politics in Command’. If you force them to pay attention to such things,
it will most probably have the opposite of the desired effect and end up
repulsing them.
In reality, in recent past decades people have developed a shared view
of things, and [as noted previously] the reason why the present Political
System is tolerated is because it has focused on the economic, it has promoted
development and has by and large set aside its previous obsession with a
quasi-movement mentality that was always trying to impose its brand of
‘Political Proselytising’ on everyone. That [had eventually seemed to] come to
an end or [at least] its interference in the private sphere had been
significantly reduced; people knew there would be no more crazy talk about ‘preferring the weeds of socialism over the sprouts of
capitalism’ [the ‘Gang of Four’ member Zhang Chunqiao’s 1975 slogan
that promoted a tolerance of the wastefulness and irrationalities of the
socialist command economy over the efficiencies and benefits of the
market-oriented policies]. Ultimately, [the slogan promoting] ‘Economic
Development as the Core’ should by all rights have begun to evolve towards
creating a core desire to pursue a constitution-based rule of law. It would be
on the basis of such a legal order that politics and the economy could work in
tandem to build a truly modern nation; thereby the two could be like joint
handmaidens at the birth of modern China. However, given the present
circumstances, the most we can hope for is that the former [that is, economic
development] will be pursued unstintingly. By all rights, it should be
unthinkable that some other plan should be afoot or that anyone could seriously
be considering a policy volte-face.
Fear Three: Class Struggle, Again
Starting a few years ago the official media and Party ideologues began
to talk again about Class Struggle [that is, imposing artificial
socio-political categories on individuals and groups and demonising,
ostracising or otherwise scapegoating perceived enemies for political and
economic ends]. By now, people have become increasingly anxious about this. The
general thrust of politics in recent times has led people to speculate about
the possible revival of the farrago of Class Struggle-based Politics of the
kind pursued by Stalin and Mao Shaoshan [Mao Shaoshan is a classically styled
derogatory name for Mao Zedong. Here the author has substituted Shaoshan in
Hunan province, the name of Mao’s birth place, for his personal name]. Even
worse is that, given the continued pursuit of the Anti-Corruption Campaign
[initiated by Party leaders under Xi Jinping from early 2013], and in
particular with the establishment of this new and all-powerful National
Supervisory Commission [formally inaugurated in March 2018] — a party-state
institution with authority over all government employees and teachers [and that
is empowered to use politically determined goals to exercise nationwide
control] — people have little confidence in being able to protect their legal
rights. Quite the opposite, in fact — people can’t help but think that all of
these developments are a dark augury that foretells the advent of a new form of
KGB-style control [pursued by a secretive Party bureaucracy] that will
invariably become embroiled in the factional politics of the Communist Party.
That is why people are panicked about the possibility that we may be witnessing
a return to the long-gone days of Class Struggle. Understandably then, many
people increasingly feel alienated from our nation’s political life; the
general social ambience of relative peace and harmony is thus under threat.
After all, memories of a political model that was based on constant and
pitiless Struggle [repeatedly from 1949 to 1978 and then again during a series
of purges in 1980, 1983, 1987 and 1989, and beyond] remains fresh in people’s
memories and the concern that such a regime could well be imposed on China
again is very real.
Given the two-term limit imposed on state leaders [formerly stipulated
by the Constitution, a regulation that would normally have resulted in a
defined ten-year period of rule for Xi Jinping, but which was abandoned in
March 2018] and the promise of a process of orderly political succession within
the Communist Party itself, people were hopeful that China would continue to
evolve towards becoming a normal, and normalised, country, one in which both
property rights and human rights would, over time, be granted appropriate
expression in, and protection by, the Constitution.
It was assumed that the old mantra of ‘Ceaseless Struggle’ had lost its
power. In recent years, however, it seems as though, yet again, we are moving
in the opposite direction [from the one in which we were previously headed]. It
is no surprise that there is widespread alarm.
Fear Four: A New Closed-Door Policy
Just as we are at loggerheads with the United States — the
representative of the [civilised] Western World — China is pursuing renewed
intimacy with heinous regimes like North Korea. China’s economic development
and social progress are part and parcel of this nation’s self-advancement as a
civilisation. This is a continuation of the logic of a process of
Civilisational Transformation that has been taking place for over 150 years,
one that has seen a backward nation being able once more to participate in the
unfolding global system. It is not a process simply authored or directed by
external forces. But in terms of practical policy, [from the late 1970s] China
reinvigorated policies [and ideas] related to Economic Reform and the Open Door
[which had been integral to previous efforts to modernise the nation from the
mid-nineteenth century, dating from the years of the Tongzhi Restoration
(1861-1874), and again during the Self-Strengthing Movement that was related to
that restoration].
Concomitantly, relations with the West had improved and were moving in
a progressive direction so much so that China would [as the slogan of the Jiang
Zemin era when China worked to join the WTO in 2001 put it] be able to ‘be
integrated within the global community’ [and in the process acclimatise to its
norms and practices]. This was possible because of the nation’s fast-tracking
development helped globalise economic
activity. If it were not for the fact that the ‘Open Door Forced [Ever Greater]
Reform’ [meaning that the pressures brought to bear on the Chinese system by
its global trade policies were constantly putting pressure on the party-state
to extend, often reluctantly, its internal economic and structural reform
agenda], China would not enjoy the economic, social and cultural prosperity
that it does today.
Now, for China to buddy up to failed states and totalitarian regimes
like North Korea and Venezuela not only goes against the popular will, it flies
in the face of the tide of history. Indeed, it lacks political vision. [Given
the anomalies of the present situation,] Ordinary folk are understandably
scathing as they mock what they have been witnessing: large swathes of the
cadre-ocracy and their progeny long ago squirreled away considerable amounts of
their ill-gotten wealth in those very foreign climes [that are now officially
being attacked, that is, North America]. That is why so many people are not
overly concerned about rising tensions in the Sino-US relationship.
However, if by chance there is some major slip-up [in the Sino-US
relationship] China as a whole will surely suffer, as will the nation’s wealth,
something that, in theory at least, rightfully belongs to all the people.
Regardless, the effects will be felt by ordinary Chinese men and women; they
will feel it in the hip pocket. What really lies at the root cause [of
hubristic official behaviour that has permitted tensions with the United States
to escalate while Beijing embraces North Korea] is that the requirements of One
Political Party [that is, the Communists] outweigh the reasonable and rational
needs of the nation. [To disguise this reality,] a twisted statist logic is
employed [by the party-state propaganda machine] to repress and pervert popular
common sense. With no real will to pursue [the reform process] in a positive
fashion, yet harboring a dogged determination to indulge in their own
willfulness, [The Powers That Be] have been failing to keep up with the
currents of modern thought. And so the present folly is pursued as if it is the
most natural thing to do.
Fear Five: Excessive International Aid
Over-investment in international aid may well result in deprivations at
home. It is said that China is now the world’s largest source of international
aid; its cash-splashes are counted in the billions or tens of billions of
dollars. For a developing country with a large population many of whom still
live in a pre-modern economy, such behaviour is outrageously disproportionate.
These are policies born of ‘Vanity Politics’; they reflect the flashy
showmanship of the boastful and they are odious. The nation’s wealth —
including China’s three trillion dollars in foreign reserves — has been
accumulated over the past four decades from the blood and sweat of working
people, in fact, it has actually been built up as a result of successive
policies and countless struggles dating back to the Self-Strengthening Movement
[launched during the Tongzhi Restoration during the 1860s when, following its
defeat in the Second Opium War, the ruling court of the Qing-dynasty adopted
the first modernising reform agenda in Chinese history. By saying this Xu is
rejecting the Communist narrative of modern Chinese history and its
soteriology]. How can you have squandered this bounty so heedlessly?
The era of fast-paced economic growth will come to an end; surely such
wanton generosity can not be tolerated, for it is generosity which, in many
ways, is a copy of [the vainglorious Maoist-era policies when China boasted
that it was the centre of world revolution to] ‘Support Asia-Africa-Latin
America’ [meaning, in essence, that an impoverished China was generously giving
aid to Third World countries in an effort to gain political advantage and
counter the influence both of the American imperialists and the Soviet
revisionists]. In the process that policy forced countless millions of Chinese
to tighten their belts simply so they could survive. Revolutionary generosity
overseas even led to the corpses of those who had starved to death being
scattered in the fields.
Following the recent outbreak of the Sino-US Trade War, the official
state media has called on the nation to ‘Overcome the
Present Difficulties in a Spirit of Unity’, a slogan
that has been widely mocked. [Note: The slogan is a reformulation of the older
expression, although it was immediately recast by online jokers as: ‘times are tough so we should all oppose the Communists’]. Added to this propaganda push, there’s
all that grand pontificating [expressed by using a common quote from an essay
by the Song-dynasty writer Fan Zhongyan] about how ‘One
should put the cares of the nation ahead of the enjoyment of the individual’. Well, in their wisdom the Masses have responded to such
nonsense with merciless derision: ‘Fuck you!’, you hear people say, and, ‘What the hell does that have to
do with anything?’ Such sentiments reflect popular sentiment; today people
can’t be duped in the same way that you fooled the hapless and uncomplaining
subjects of yesteryear.
Fear Six: Repression of the Intelligentsia
There has been a leftward [that is, repressive, Mao-era-like] turn in
policies related to the intelligentsia, along with a renewed imposition of
Thought Reform [replicating a movement launched by the Party in 1952 when
university professors, employees and people
in the state bureaucracy were required to confess to their ideological
backwardness, unquestioningly accept Party dogma and learn to parrot it both in
dedicated study sessions and publicly]. Although it has long been said that
intellectuals [a broad category including many who are educated, as well as
educators] are part of the working class [this was Party policy until the High
Maoist years of 1957-1976, during which intellectuals were regarded as
dangerous ideological enemies; from 1977, Deng Xiaoping championed the role and
status of the educated, technocratic elite], but at the first hint of a slight
policy tremor the educated are unfairly targeted again, or indeed treated like
the enemy.
The most reliable political barometer of the regnant dynasty has been
its treatment of intellectuals and those policies directly reflect the tenor of
the nation’s life. In recent times, the Ministry of Education has repeatedly
called for the intensification of Ideological Education among educators [so
that they in turn can be equipped to inculcate the correct political ideas and
attitudes among their students]. Online speculation holds that returnee
teachers who have studied overseas are regarded as being a particular threat.
Meanwhile, a small clutch of Remnant Leftists [‘New Leftists’ and
anti-humanists who support various aspects of a revived Maoist ideology, some
of the most famous of whom are celebrated by the ‘performative-leftists’ of the
international academic world] in the tertiary sector are jumping for joy; it’s as though they have been given a new lease on life
[literally, ‘it’s as though
they’ve been injected with chicken blood’ — a satirical reference to late-Cultural Revolution-era
quackery. See Joel Martinsen, Injecting Chicken Blood]. They are virtually
bounding about in a blood-thirsty frenzy. All of these phenomena contribute to
a general atmosphere of fear, a trepidation among intellectuals that enforced
Ideological Reform [that is the demand for intellectual conformity] is now
making a comeback. The leftward turn in educational policy and a mooted Thought
Reform movement may indicate that even more extreme developments are on the
cards.
‘Inappropriate discussions about National Policy can get you expelled
from the Party!’
[The old expression] ’Inappropriate Discussions’ is once more being
bandied about with a deadening effect; the result is that people are being
intimidated into silence [Note: a ban on ‘Inappropriate Discussions of the
Major Policies of the Centre (of the party-state)’ came
into force from late 2015, when the Communist Party Central and its
Disciplinary Commission issued warnings against, and stipulated the punishment
of, idle speculation about Party leaders, policy and factional infighting]. In
an atmosphere such as this, how can there be any true freedom of speech?
Without Intellectual Freedom and the Independent Spirit [ an expression taken
from Chen Yinque’s famous 1929 epitaph for Wang Guowei,
and a long-cherished formulation embraced by China’s liberal intellectuals from
the 1980s, one with roots in the Republican era when it was celebrated in
particular by academics at Tsinghua University] what hope is there for people
to explore the unknown, for the advancement of scholarship or for intellectual
creativity?
Up until recently, given the positive legacy of the last four decades —
one that should be further enhanced by the concerted efforts of the next few
generations — there was good reason to believe that [in the future] Chinese
Civilisation could well enjoy an extraordinary peak of achievement in terms
both of its intellectual richnesss and its scholastic heft. However, if the
policies clamping down on free speech continue, or are extended even further,
such hopes will remain unrealised. China will end up as little more than a cultural
backwater of intellectual dwarfs.
Fear Seven: A New Arms Race and the Danger of War, Including Another
Cold War
Over the last decade, Asia as a whole has for all intents and purposes
entered an arms race. Fortunately, the probability of war has so far been
restrained within acceptable parameters. A pressing issue for China is that we
cannot afford to disrupt our developmental trajectory or further frustrate the
Great Modern Transformation [that has been unfolding for nearly two centuries]
just as it is within sight of being realised. Over the past two years, I have
written two essays — ‘Don’t Let Civil War Break Out in China’
and ‘Protect the Reform Policies and the Open Door’ [both collected in Xu Zhangrun’s
book The Rational State and Superior Politics: a Chinese Understanding of China’s Problems, Hong Kong City University Press, 2017] — in which I argued that China has added a System of Military
Preparedness to its existing Stability Maintenance Regime [mentioned above]. I
did so in an effort to point out the inherent dangers in such a development and
to forewarn people of its negative consequences.
At the moment, as the political atmosphere in China becomes
increasingly repressive and the country continues to be entangled in a foreign
trade dispute, there is an heightened possibility of an economic downturn,
something that could lead to things that are beyond control and that may have a
raft of unintended consequences. In such a situation it is not unreasonable to
be fearful that tensions could spark some kind of military conflict, be it
either a hot or a cold war. We should be ever alert to the urgency of
preventing such a development.
Popular wisdom holds that a trade conflict between China and the United
States should not be used as a pretext [by the propagandists and policy
advisers] for heightened ideological contestation, nor should there be a
competition over which side has a superior political system. However, I fear
that my earlier concerns have been justified by the evidence of just such
consequential developments.
Fear Eight: The End of Reform and a Return to Totalitarianism
Even though the word ‘Reform’ is somewhat tarnished now and, despite
the fact that even rather reprehensible polities use it as camouflage,
nonetheless, given the discursive environment of contemporary China and the
fact that we are at a time in the country’s life when our long-term Great
Transformation requires a major final push, and as we are wary of some
explosive revolution or a regression to a form of extreme leftism breaking out,
I would argue that Reform remains the most prudent and promising way forward
for China. The engine of the nation’s reform, however, has been idling for the
last few years; [now,] if it isn’t used to propel us forward we will inevitably
go into reverse. In fact, this state of affairs was already the hallmark of the
last term of government [that is, Xi Jinping’s first term in office, from 2012
to 2017]. Given the overall direction being taken by the Party-State people are
entirely justified in asking whether the Economic Reform Policies and the Open
Door have run their course and will a return to totalising politics replace
them? Who knows? At the moment, this question is of the greatest concern to the
largest number of Chinese.
During the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao decade [from 2003 to late 2012] it
seemed as though the Totalitarian was transitioning towards the Authoritarian;
that’s why some dubbed the resulting arrangement a
‘Post-Totalitarian-360-Degree-Authoritarian Political System’. Over the last
two years, however, we have seen things moving in the opposite direction once
more, ergo there is a widespread anxiety that we may all be witnessing a
‘Thorough-going Return to Totalitarian Politics’.
Modern Chinese history teaches us that first, because of the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and then, with the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance
starting in 1937 [and continuing until 1945], China’s advance towards modernity
was repeatedly interrupted. Modernity was derailed and those wars put paid to hopes
that the country might enjoy a normal political life.
We are presently approaching the final stages of a profound
Transformation that has unfolded over nearly two centuries [starting with the
political and military disruptions of the Daoguang era of the Manchu-Qing
dynasty and the First Opium War in 1840]. We need a final push to achieve our
goal [, a point that the anxious author has already made a number of times].
Under no circumstances can the nation be derailed again by yet more military
conflict. If that were to happen we must ask: when will history present us with
another opportunity? Heaven only knows!
***
3: Eight Immediate Hopes
In outlining the above anxieties and limning the broadly felt sense of
panic in China today, I have focussed on the domestic political realm — I have
not expanded my considerations to consider matters related to the economy or
trade (including the issue of massive tax cuts), nor have I touched on the
provocative themes of democracy and rule of law. Below, I further confine
myself by offering a series of concrete policy suggestions that I believe are
of immediate relevance.
The First Hope: Put a Stop to Empty Grand Gestures and Wasteful
International Largesse
Average Chinese are most often outraged by the way in which the State
splurges large sums of money through international aid to little or no benefit.
China is still slowly making its way up the steep slope of development. In
terms both of basic infrastructure and social facilities, as well as in regard
to people’s ability to access limited forms of social welfare, we are
confronting massive problems; our burden is great and the road forward
stretches far. Here I am making this point without even mentioning the crisis
in aged care, or issues related to employment opportunities and education.
Rural destitution is a widespread and crushing reality; greater support
through public policy initiatives is essential. Without major changes, half of
China will be stuck in what is little more that a pre-modern economic state. That
will mean that any hope to create a truly modern China will remain frustrated,
or half-hearted at best. If this situation continues what’s the use of all that
talk about the Great Revival of Chinese Civilisation?
At the recent China-Arab States Cooperation Forum [on 10 July 2018] the
Chinese Leadership [that is, Xi Jinping] announced that twenty billion US
dollars would be made available for ‘Dedicated Reconstruction Projects’ in the
Arab world. On top of that, [Xi Jinping declared that] ‘a further one billion
yuan will be offered to support social stability efforts in the region.’
Everyone knows full well that the Gulf States are literally oozing with wealth.
Why is China, a country with over one hundred million people living below the
poverty line, playing at being the flashy big-spender? People will be grumbling
in astonishment: What can the Supreme Bureaucratic Authority possibly be
thinking? Don’t They care about our own people?
Furthermore, Those who indulge in such grand and expensive gestures evince
no respect for existing budgetary procedures or institutional formalities; in
the process They shunt aside a National People’s Congress that is
constitutionally empowered to maintain budgetary oversight. As a result,
existing institutionalised bureaucratic mechanisms are, for all intents and
purposes, paralysed. To act in this way is like declaring on the authority of
the Constitution and the Rule of Law.
The Second Hope: Put an End to Diplomatic Extravagance
Even the most commonplace international meeting organised in China
today involves extraordinary levels of expense. There is no regard for budgets;
fiscal waste and the heedless loss of human work hours is considerable. Even
worse: most of these activities are completely content-free and vacuous. They
are all about pursuing ‘Vanity Politics’ rather than ‘Practical Politics’, let
alone ‘Hard-edged Politics’. Such events have nothing to do with the so-called
‘venerable traditional of warmth and hospitality demonstrated by the Chinese
people from ancient times’; only the most vain and self-serving [leaders and
bureaucrats like to] indulge in such things. If foreigners were to copy what we
constantly do here, then the VIP-filled headquarters of the United Nations in
New York would be on police lock-down 24/7, and the headquarters of the
numerous international organisations based in Geneva and Paris would perforce
have to stage nightly fireworks displays, with their personnel expected to be
decked out in all their finery all of the time.
As independent entities countries should aim for validation by means of
their actual national strength; thereby they will be able to pursue their own
national interest through regular international activities, exhibiting in the
process certain values and moral probity. All of these things can co-exist and
they can indeed have a net benefit for one’s people.
Glory and respect will come naturally as a result. — To
lack this breadth of understanding and instead devote considerable energy to
the kind of political grandstanding I’m talking about here, even though the
Host himself might feel very smug about it, is simply a waste of human
resources; it is the behavior of a wastrel who is heedless with the public
purse.
Moreover, it is more often the case that such excessive displays
actually generate cloaked contempt among the foreign guests and they merely
serve to excite popular outrage among one’s own people. Even our Lard-Arse
neighbour — Kim Jong-un, a loathsome dictator ostracised by the international
community — was welcomed to Beijing with an extravagant motorcade; you can see
the reports in all of in the print and electronic media. Gossip even has it
that top-tier Special Mou-tai valued at 1.28 million yuan a bottle [sic] was
served at the official banquet. To be quite frank, this single gesture offended
and alienated untold numbers of people in China. So, as for the so-called China
Dream, all I can say is: Dream On!
The Third Hope: End the Privileges of the
Party Nobility
Elite privileges for retired high-level
cadres should be eliminated. The system of the present ‘dynasty’ [a dynastic-era term for ‘court-as-country’] allows for the state to provide inclusive
retirement-to-grave care for high-level cadres on a level far and away above
that possible for the average citizen. These cadres are allowed to retain the
extravagant privileges that they enjoyed during their working lives, including
premium health care and special access to luxury resorts for recreation and
holidays. Everyone is aware of the financial burden this places on the people,
although details are never released for fear of sparking public outrage.
This system replicates the kinds of prerogative that were provided to
the ruling Imperial Zhu Family during the Ming dynasty [founded by Zhu
Yuanzhang in 1368CE], as well as the emoluments permitted to the families of
the Eight Banners [jakūn gūsa,
the exclusive Manchu military and administrative groups that were crucial to
the founding and rule of the Qing dynasty in 1644; those privileges continued
until the abdication of the Royal House in early 1912].
For this secret system to continue to exist is not merely a betrayal of
the self-advertised ‘Revolutionary Spirit’ [of the Communist Party], it is also
in breach of modern standards of civic life. Why bother with all that talk
about ‘the dangerous remnants of feudalism’? This is a perfect example of it!
People are outraged but powerless to do anything about such institutionalised
privilege and it is one of the main reasons why people regard the whole
party-state system with utter contempt.
On one side of the hospital Commoners face the challenges of being able
to gain admission for treatment, while everyone knows that luxury suites are
reserved on the other side for the care of high-level cadres. The people observe
this with mute and heartfelt bitterness. Every iota of this bottled up anger
may, at some unexpected moment, explode with thunderous fury.
The Fourth Hope: End the System of Luxury Provisioning
Eliminate the system of Special Needs or Luxury Goods Provisioning.
Starting in [the wartime Communist guerrilla base] Yan’an
some seventy years ago, this system [whereby Party cadres/ government
bureaucrats — the nomenklatura —
have been permitted privileged access to goods and services depending on their
rank in a multi-tier network] continued unimpeded even during times of mass
famine and deprivation. And it continues even now as the Vast Masses express
ever greater concerns about [the quality of and access to] dairy products for
their babies and the hygiene and safety of their everyday foodstuffs.
The Special Needs Provisioning system allows the high-level Party
nobility access to a vast range of specialty products far beyond the dreams of
the average person. Apart from a few totalitarian polities, there is no other
country that does this on such a prodigious scale as China. Without doubt this
is a case of what was traditionally excoriated as ‘luxury
in the extreme and shamelessness that defies description’.
Of course, inequalities exist in all societies and disparities in
ability and wealth are a reality, but they are a result of various practical
differences, not due to the fact that the ideal playing field imagined by our
citizens simply does not permit a level starting point. And I’m not even
talking about the outrage people feel because they know that an elite group of Party grandees is continuously
mollycoddled by [their political party] dipping into the coffers of the state.
As long as this system and ‘No 34’ [a code word for the
regulations covering special access to necessities and luxury goods provided to
the Party nomenklatura which was set up after 1955. See ‘Providing
for the Leadership’ in Barmé,
More Saliva than Tea, 2012] remains unchecked, real food safety in China can
never truly be assured. As a result, neither side will really be certain of its
own long-term security.
The Fifth Hope: Require Officials to Divulge their Personal Assets
People have been calling for a law that requires officials to gazette
their assets for many years, without result [Note: this was also an early
demand of student protesters in 1989]. It is obvious that this is where the
real skulduggery takes place and that is why the truth cannot be revealed. As
cadres and government bureaucrats scale the ladder of officialdom there is a
complete lack of transparency about how personal assets are accrued by their
children and their families. This closely guarded secret is hidden deep in the
Party’s personnel files. Normal people have no knowledge of what is really
going on and everything is clouded in obfuscation.
In terms of the state’s ability and economic wherewithal, let alone in
terms of technical ability, all is in readiness [to reveal the truth about who
owns what], the only thing necessary is for the system to be activated. If that
were to happen then, via the national Internet, and with the oversight of 1.4
billion pairs of eyes, everything would immediately become clear. Despite all
of the ongoing anti-corruption activities [which are a key feature of the Xi
Jinping era], egregious new instances of corruption are constantly being
generated. That is because both [the anti-corruption push as well as the
corrupt activities themselves] take place internally (and secretly), none
involve a legal process based on the principles of open and transparent
politics. What is missing is a ‘Sunshine Policy’: if you really have nothing to
hide, then implement such a policy and finally everything be out in the open!
If you want to demonstrate the sincerity of your statements, then join the
majority of other countries who have signed up to the anti-money laundering
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Why conceal yourself in the
obfuscating mists of rhetoric and treat the Vast Multitudes of China like
simpletons?
The Sixth Hope: Put an Immediate End to the New Personality Cult
An emergency brake must be applied to the unfolding Personality Cult.
Who would have thought that, after four decades of Economic Reforms and the
Open Door, our Sacred Land would witness a new Personality Cult? The Party
media is going to extreme lengths to create a new Idol; in the process it is
offering up to the world an image of China as a Modern Totalitarianism.
Portraits of the Leader are now hoisted on high throughout the Land, as though
they are possessed of some Spiritual Mana. This only serves to add to the
absurd situation. On top of that, the speeches of That Official — things that
were previously simply recorded by secretaries in a pro forma bureaucratic
manner — are now painstakingly collected in finely bound editions, printed in
vast quantities and handed out freely worldwide. The profligate waste of paper
alone is enough to make you shake your head in disbelief.
All of this reflects the low IQ of the Concerned Official and His
craving for fame. More importantly, we need to ask how a vast country like
China, one that was previously so ruinously served by a Personality Cult [that
of Mao Zedong], has no resistance to this new cult, and this includes the
droves of ‘Theoreticians’ and ‘Researchers’ who acquiesce to it. In
fact, they are outdoing themselves with their sickeningly slavish behaviour
[literally ‘licking the carbuncles and sucking liquid
from the ulcers’ (of the Power-Holder to gain favour and solicit reward)]. It’s
as though hundreds of millions of Chinese are oblivious; people tolerate the
New Cult and allow it unfettered freedom; they are powerless in the face of the
arse-kissing bureaucrats.
This just goes to show that China’s Enlightenment is far from over.
Every generation must champion rationalism in public affairs and continue
painstakingly to forge a way ahead into the future. This New Cult is proof that
China faces a very long struggle before it can lay claim to being a modern,
secular and rational nation-state.
The Seventh Hope: Restore Term Limits for the National Presidency
International opinion was astounded by the decision made earlier in
this year [March 2018] to revise the Constitution and abandon the term limits
set for the State Presidency. In China, this move led to widespread and
profound anxiety. Overnight it seemed ‘As though we were shocked awake after a
four-decade-long dream.’ Suddenly, as if out of nowhere, we had a ‘Supreme
Leader’ with no checks on his power. How could people not give in to all kinds
of strange imaginings and new fears?
That is why I suggest as a matter of urgency that, at an appropriate
time during this or the coming year — say, for instance, at a Special Meeting
of the National People’s Congress this autumn or at the scheduled annual
convocation of the Congress in March 2019 — a further revision of the
Constitution be made to reinstate the term limit on the presidency. To do so
would vouchsafe the policies of the Economic Reforms and Open Door era while
frustrating any slide towards the totalitarian politics of the Cultural
Revolution.
China has a Constitution and, regardless of its quality, it is, after
all, the nation’s Basic Law. It should not be revised willy-nilly. I would,
however, note that it is actually still a Temporary Constitution formulated as
the result of a particular political arrangement during what has in effect
become a crucial transitional period in the nation’s life; therefore it cannot
but be repeatedly subject to revision. Hopefully, this will be the final
necessary revision of the Constitution before an eventual transition [to
substantive democracy] is achieved.
The Eighth Hope: Overturn the Verdict on
June Fourth
Overturn the Verdict on ‘June Fourth’ [, the 1989 Beijing Massacre].
Over this and next year China will mark a series of sensitive anniversaries. It
will be: the fourth decade since the launching of policies [known as] the
Economic Reforms and the Open Door; the centenary of the May Fourth Movement
[of 1919, a major feature of which was modern student activism and strident
patriotism; the movement was a
contributing factor behind the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in
1921]; as well as the thirtieth anniversary of 4 June 1989. The upshot of the
Sino-US Trade War will extend through this period and will only serve to add to
the uncertainty of things.
In pursuit of the usual posture of Stability Maintenance [the
authorities will doubtless] ‘use policing methods to
deal with political issues’, in the process of which
they will ‘deploy the mechanisms of the state machine
to clamp down on the political situation’. It is
expected that the party-state system would rather pursue extreme repression
rather than approaching things by ‘dealing with
politics by employing politics [for the resolution of things]’
[as we witness in the West when they confront difficult issues].
Back in the day, the ‘5th of April’ [1976 Tiananmen Incident when
protesters flooded into Tiananmen Square to mourn the recently deceased premier
Zhou Enlai and denounced Mao and his coterie, later known as the ‘Gang of
Four’] was officially re-evaluated and, since then, what was a problematic date
has no longer been one of any particular political sensitivity. This was
precisely because [following Mao’s death, the authorities] ‘confronted a political
problem by employing a political solution’ — as the old saying puts it: ‘when
an army approaches a good general knows how to block its advance; when the
waters rise we know how to sandbag against flooding’. Everyone was able to take
from that [decision regarding the 5 April 1976 Tiananmen Incident] what they
wanted, and all were satisfied.
That’s why, in light of the upcoming thirtieth anniversary of 4 June
[in 2019], I would encourage Those In Power to find a suitable moment either
this or next year to rehabilitate ‘4 June’ publicly [that is, to re-evaluate an
event which is still officially classified as a necessary military action
launched to quell a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ by hooligans in Beijing,
supported by inimical American and other foreign forces, against the Chinese
state with the aim of toppling the Communist Party]. This would not only
demonstrate a sincere and wise application of the principle of ‘politics
embracing the political’, it would also mean that from then on there would be
no need to treat 4 June every year as though it were a political emergency.
[The authorities, that is Xi Jinping] Would clear the
way for all Chinese to enjoy a peaceful coexistence, it would uplift people
psychologically and benefit [the party-state] by adding political capital to
its legitimacy.
The Eight Hopes outlined here merely give expression to what one would
call contemporary political commonsense; they also sum up widespread appeals
and desires [regularly expressed] within the populace at large. Herein I am —
to use an old expression — ‘Putting My Life on the Line Simply to Say What
Everyone Already Knows and Thinks’.
In this vast world of great disorder, if there is no reasonable way to
express such views there can then be no [reasonable way to legitimate them through
appropriate] legislation. If that is the case, neither I nor the Masses can
find a way to live [without fear]. What to do? Alas and Alack indeed!
***
4: In What is a Period of Transition
Don’t panic just yet since, although over the past two years the world
has entered a mini-cycle of political adjustment, the dust has far from
settled. For China to get through this period it is of crucial importance for
the nation to continue along its chosen path of sustained internal reform and
focus on raising the standard of living and ameliorating the wellbeing of the
people as a whole. What matters for China and the world is that this particular
Grand Ship of State continues to catch the wind in its sails as it peacefully
steers a course on the way to continued political normality.
Conflict and warfare are part and parcel of the inherently violent
nature of the human animal. The Sacred Duty of politicians living during a
period of historical opportunity such as today is to delay or avoid entirely
the outbreak of hostilities. Such a moment is a crucial test for the wisdom and
moral probity of the Meat-Eaters [an ancient term from pre-dynastic times that
refers to the social and political elite who, according to court regulations,
were permitted to eat meat].
Human beings are, above all, political animals, and politics is the
ultimate expression of human ingenuity. What is necessary in the here and now
is that, no matter what the present situation happens to be, we cannot allow
ourselves to deviate from the grand course of Peaceful Development. We are
enjoying a sustained period of historic opportunity that only the wise can
truly take advantage of. We don’t need heedless antagonism and we must make
every effort to make sure that we do not cast aside the good hand that we have
been dealt.
The Great Powers on either side of the Pacific [China and the United
States] now find themselves by chance ‘Under the Rule of Old Red Guards’ [this
is a somewhat baffling description, first in regard to Donald Trump, a roué
whose tone is more tangerine than red and, secondly, mystifying in the case of
Xi Jinping who was more of a ‘Blackguard’, that is from a family under attack in the early Cultural
Revolution, than a ‘Red Guard’,
although he is very much a product of Mao’s Cultural
Revolution]. This is and can only something that happens in a transitional
moment; it’s the typical kind of unruly coincidence that occurs during periods
of heightened historical drama.
On this side of the ocean we have One who has no real historical
awareness or truly modern political sensibility, let alone a moral vision that
reflects an appreciation of the principles of universal civilisation. The One
is blind to the Grand Way of current affairs and is scarred indelibly by the political
branding he suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Overweening pride and
official competence leads this One to bend his efforts to serve the wrong ends;
talented enough to play the bureaucratic game, and doubtlessly masterful at
achieving high office, but as for Guiding the Nation along the Correct Path,
[what the One does] is worse than arrant time-wasting, for there is something
perverse at work in him.
And there, on the other side of the Pacific, a crowd of the Ghoulish
Undead nurtured on the politics of the Great Game and the Cold War have taken
the stage. Certainly, they have their own analysis of world affairs and a
particular understanding of the cultural upheavals of today, but like their
opposite number here, they lack a truly historical perspective; they are
shortsighted and avaricious. Since their diagnosis is faulty, the prescriptions
they offer are completely off the mark. Trained in a mercantilism that favoured
the capitalist elite, with a personality amplified by bloated self-regard and
the lifetime habits of rapaciousness, the result is [Donald Trump, a person
possessed of] a prideful quasi-imperial mindset that is coupled to heinous
vulgarity. We now have [to deal with] the crudest of blackmailers, a person who
knows no shame. What, therefore, [in the case of the United States today] we
are presented with is but a degraded civilisation under the tutelage of a
flailing and desperate imperialism that is itself in terminal decline. Their
boastful and vainglorious patriotism stokes the fires of national disaster; we
know them all too well as ‘Patriot-Scoundrels’ [literally ‘patriot thieves’; the kind of shyster who boastfully promotes themselves
while sullying everything else in the guise of loyalty].
Be it in China or abroad, in the present or in the past: we’ve seen
their kind before. One is reminded of those [recent] jokes about how ‘Bad
People Have Gotten Older’ [a reference to a popular comic observation that:
‘It’s not that old people have suddenly turned bad, it’s
just that bad people have gotten older’].
Everyone is the product of the education they receive. So [for the ‘Old
Red Guard’ on that side of the ocean, that is, Donald Trump] there’s no way he
can break out of those self-made shackles; he simply doesn’t give a damn, on top
of which he’s completely lacking in self-awareness. Dealing with new problems
within the framework of an out-of-touch mindset while nonetheless exuding
supreme confidence, he inevitably makes all the mistakes of the willful. Their
ideas and policies are, as Alexis de Tocqueville said [of the Ancien Régime],
nothing more than a load of musty debris. [Note: Like autocrats elsewhere,
Chinese Communist Party leaders are fascinated by the history of regime
collapse. Shortly after joining the Standing Committee of the Party’s ruling
Politburo in late 2012, and as head of the Central Disciplinary Commission
charged with oversight of Xi Jinping’s ‘signature’ anti-corruption campaign,
Wang Qishan recommended that his underlings study de Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the French Revolution.]
At this moment, taking stock of the general tenor of discussion in the
Chinese-speaking world, and the mentality that it reflects, it is evident that
a kind of political awareness based on civilian rationalism has grown to maturity;
nor is it lacking in proud righteousness. What would appear to be deficient,
however, is a cultural self-awareness based on national rationality. In
particular people seem to have difficulty identifying National Rationality as
it relates to the political relations between nations, and National Rationality
in terms of how citizens engage with their own political lives [that is, a mood
of dangerous emotionalism readily leads people to act against their own, and
their country’s actual self-interest]. The confusion between the two, with
neither besting the other, in some cases leads people to admire that Old Red
Guard reprobate on the other side of the Pacific [Note: many soi-disant
liberals in China became ‘Trump fans’ 川粉
out of a belief that his disruptive tenure would benefit their anti-Communist
cause in China]. These tyros end up being little better than those rednecks
from the Rust Belt. To apply a famous line from a famous person, they are ‘Too
Young, Too Simple’ [this is a jocular reference to former Party leader, Jiang
Zemin, who once berated a young Hong Kong journalist for their naïveté. Here the Chinese transliteration of ‘too
young, too simple’ — tǔ-yàng-tǔ-suī-pɑo — is a play on Jiang’s Yangzhou-accented English pronunciation. In the original,
Jiang also said ‘sometimes naïve’]. At the same time,
the appeal of [our own] political system is lacking, resulting in an
insufficient or weak sense of identity. The upshot of all of this is a strange
contradiction between Citizens and Civic Awareness. But then again, although the
‘Great Qing’ [dynasty ruled by
the Manchus] was enmeshed with ‘China’,
they weren’t really one and the same thing at all.
You [Communists] ‘Rule the Rivers and Mountains’ [a traditional expression that indicates control over the
geo-political and civilisational realm of China]; you ‘Gorge
Yourselves on the Rivers and Mountains’ [literally, ‘Eat/ consume the Rivers and Mountains’
but, when Your Rivers and Mountains are in trouble, suddenly we are all
expected to pull together and [help you] ‘Protect the
Rivers and Mountains’, as well as ‘Join
as One to Overcome Present Difficulties’ [that have
resulted from the trade war]. What utter nonsense!
There is discussion in the non-official media that although certain
figures are seemingly busying themselves [in negotiations] they are really
acting as they though they aren’t Chinese; instead they devote their real
energies to coming up with ways to convenience the other side. Oddly enough,
this is not all that surprising. After all, this is the kind of scenario you
should expect in a nation that lacks a coherent and unifying focus.
Putting aside debates about identity and what ‘Being Chinese’ really
means, given the present situation, there are those Prophets who each say their
piece and in their proud justifications end up finding no common ground for
compromise.
Allow me to reiterate my previous observation: a nation’s maturity
relies on the nurturing authority of its intellectual elite, and for their
wisdom to have full sway they require a freedom of spirit. All the hullaballoo
produced by red noise and the attempts to silence independent voices cannot in
the long run detract from the realities of shared human ideas. It is necessary
to reject the misguided folly and pridefulness of any and all Absolute
Authorities. In China it is necessary to call for an end to the present state
of ever-increasing censorship and to give freedom of expression back to the
intelligentsia [literally, ‘those who read books’]. For only then, and only with the painstaking work of
generations, can the motherlode of Chinese Civilisation truly be regenerated
and nurtured, its role protected and its relevance strengthened. Only then will
it be possible to confront the full range of unfolding possibilities with
clear-sightedness; only then will it be possible to respond calmly to immediate
challenges in such a way that we can apply ourselves to playing a practical
role society and in the world.
At present, the Authorities repeatedly claim that despite the Trade War
they will not reverse China’s national policy of Economic Reform and the Open
Door; they will not slacken their efforts in pursuing economic development via
continued open-door exchange; and, they reaffirm their determination to work
collectively to protect the multilateral international system. A series of
relevant policies have been announced that seem to reflect this official stand
that would seem to offer a measure of certainty. This should probably be
regarded as further evidence of the view that the ‘Open Door [to the outside
world] Forces [Further substantive] Reform [in China]’. This is a particularly
Chinese kind of ‘developmental path dependence’. Yet despite [all the talk], we
have yet to see any meaningful internal reforms being mooted. As the old saying
puts it: ‘Though the heavens may crackle with thunder, only a few drops of rain
are falling’; despite all the expressions of sincerity [from the Authorities],
the lack of practical results leaves people cold and with no choice but to look
on from the sidelines impotent and unconvinced.
It is for this reason that I have offered here my Eight Immediate Hopes
— a series of concrete policy suggestions that I believe are of timely
relevance. Let’s see what happens.
Forget all the pretty talk about You being willing and able to take
action. We’d be delighted if you managed to implement even one of these Eight
Hopes. If you carry out three or four, we’ll sing your praises and bless you in
our hearts. However, if you manage to implement all eight then the whole of
China will erupt in rapturous rejoicing.
Earlier this year, the Supremo said a series of impressive policy
measures would be launched to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Economic
Reforms and the Open Door. Well, we’ve already passed the six-month mark and,
although we are still wanting to believe, we’re also still waiting. [Note: In
the event, no substantive new policies were announced.]
And, while I’m at it, let me take this opportunity to say: there are
only fifty to sixty households in Liangjiahe Village in Shaanxi, and the place
only has a population of over a hundred people [where Xi Jinping spent seven
supposedly formative years; nowadays, as part of the state-manufactured Xi
Cult, Liangjiahe is accorded the status of a ‘sacred site’]. Yet, despite such
modest statistics the place now boasts a representative office in Shanghai that
features an exhibition space for showcasing local agriculture produce. It is
more than obvious that the unassuming and frugal farmers [of Liangjiahe] didn’t
come up with any of this themselves. Rather, one imagines that the whole
performance is being stage-managed by a duet of bureaucrats and businessmen,
each in hot pursuit of their own ends [by hoping to curry favour with Xi
Jinping].
Then there was a report informing us that the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate was creating the 12309 Disciplinary Investigative Service Centre.
The Party Secretary of Liangjiahe — a place that has absolutely nothing to do
with that initiative — was even invited to attend the ribbon-cutting ceremony
[for the new centre, held in late June 2018]. On the day, a scrum of eunuchs
was on hand, all eagerly hoping to pursue their own agendas and kissing arse as
they flaunted their shamelessness. And, as for the Academy of Social Sciences
in Shaanxi announcing that it was pursuing a research project titled ‘The
Profound Wisdom of Liangjiahe’ [announced on 21 June 2018, although disbanded
on the orders of Beijing in early July], along with all of the research topics
devoted to the Personality Cult and Leader Worship, I have this to say: they
are antediluvian; they fly in the face of progress and are an affront to
credulity; they are grotesque, cringeworthy and much, much more. As for all of
this to do [over Liangjiahe]: it’s simply too much, too excessive, over the
top, as those involved vie to outdo each other.
Such behaviour merely serves to drag us back into the Dark Ages of
fearfulness and deprivation. [in the original: the expression húsù appears in the ancient text
Mencius where it describes the trembling of an ox being being led to slaughter;
gǒucún means ‘to live in dire circumstances,
barely able to survive’.]
That’s all I’ve got to say now. We’ll see what Fate has in store; only
Heaven can judge the nation’s fortunes.
— July 2018
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中文版
Wei Jingsheng Foundation News and Article Release Issue: A1622-W1181
魏京生基金会新闻与文章发布号：A1622-W1181
Release Date: December 9, 2023
发布日：2023年12月9日
Topic: ‘Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes’ -- Xu Zhangrun (Translated and
noted by Geremie R. Barmé)
标题：我們當下的恐懼與期待
– 许章润（白杰明教授翻译英文并注释）
Original Language Version: Chinese (Chinese version at the end)
此号以中文为准（英文在前，中文在后）
如有中文乱码问题，请与我们联系或访问:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
魏京生基金会编者注：
2023年12月5日，魏京生基金会宣布授予许章润教授第二十届“魏京生中国民主斗士奖”：
消息迅速传开并被转载，其中包括著名汉学家白杰明的《中国遗产》：
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/an-award-for-professor-xu-zhangrun/
其中有关于许章润教授的杰出档案，网址为：
https://chinaheritage.net/?s=zhangrun
白杰明教授表示，尽管许章润教授在北京西郊仍受到持续监视，并被与世隔绝，但还是有可能向他传达该奖的细节。
许教授得知获奖，深感谦卑和感动，要求将该奖所附奖金回赠魏京生基金会，用于其日常运行。魏京生基金会非常感谢许教授，并将满足其请求。我们也感谢白杰明教授的消息。
以下是许教授于2018年7月24日发表的《我們當下的恐懼與期待》。白杰明教授翻译英文并注释：
https://chinaheritage.net/journal/imminent-fears-immediate-hopes-a-beijing-jeremiad/
再次，我们转载此文，以示对许教授的敬意，同时也非常感谢白杰明教授允许我们使用他的译文。
感谢大家的关注！
__ __ __
我們當下的恐懼與期待
– 许章润（白杰明教授翻译英文并注释）
【原刊於天則經濟研究所天則觀點網頁】
包括整個官僚集團在內，當下全體國民對於國家發展方向和個人身家性命安危，再度深感迷惘，擔憂日甚，已然引發全民範圍一定程度的恐慌。蓋因近年來的立國之道，突破了下列底線原則，倒行逆施，而這曾是「文革」後執政黨收拾合法性，並為三十多年的「改革開放」證明為最具正當性的政治路線，也是全體公民和平共處最低限度的社會政治共識，本不該動搖，千萬不能搖撼。
一、四條底線
那麼，是哪四項底線原則呢？
第一，維持基本治安，明確國家願景。結束連年「運動」，中止「和尚打傘無法無天」，以包括連番「嚴打」在內的強力整肅，阻止社會失範，維護社會治安，同時盡力實現社會和解，大致提供了一般民眾生聚作息的基本秩序條件，是四十年裡現有政體的底線合法性，也是歷經劫難後的億萬國民擁護「改革開放」的原因所在。雖說從治安到公正，自就業而尊嚴，公共產品的內涵缺一不可，而且時移世易，訴求必然逐次提升，但在高端產品闕如之際好歹有底線保障，對於歷經動亂和苦難的百姓而言，總是好事。畢竟，升斗小民，日常起居的美好願景不過是安寧生活，期期於溫飽小康，而以世道安靖為前提。雖說此種治安格局及其後來發展出來的「維穩」路徑，反過來滋生出新的問題，暴露出政治統治正當性不足這一致命病灶，但就其提供基本治安而言，卻是成功的，也是合意的。
不寧唯是，三十多年裡，尤其是1992年春夏之後，執政黨以經濟建設為中心，所謂「專心致志謀發展，聚精會神搞建設」，堅持二十年不變，則官民互動之下，幾個回合下來，一般國民認為不管誰上誰下，他唱罷你登場，反正發展經濟、專心國家建設這一條蔚為基本國策不會改變。有此預期兜底，遂彷彿多所安心，接受既有政體安排，你當你的官，我過我的小日子，而合作共謀出此刻這一社會治安格局。換言之，不是這個夢那個夢，而是發展經濟社會，專注於國家建設，別搞運動，安寧生計，凡此底線原則，築就了展示並通達國家道義願景的起點，也是百姓接受統治的前提。
第二，有限尊重私有產權，容忍國民財富追求。從廢除私有制，聲言私產為萬惡之源，到有限保護私有產權，容忍億萬人民對於財富增長的追求，並且訴諸立憲，所謂「私產入憲」，釋放了發家致富的普遍人欲，給予追求美好生活的人性志向以正面政治迎應。在此情形下，不僅國家經濟實力空前增長，並以此支撐了科教文衛與國防武備，特別是龐大的黨政費用，而且，一般國民亦多獲益，生活水準多所提升。此為中國經濟快速成長的法制緣由，同時說明了既有政制合法性之獲得全民容忍的經濟原因。畢竟，動什麼，別動大家的錢袋子，是硬道理。其實，此為一切正常人類社會的通則，近世產權理念與人性觀念為此特加張本，「改革開放」以「撥亂反正」皈依普世大道，實為知錯能改善莫大焉。
第三，有限容忍市民生活自由。幾十年裡，公民社會不見成長，稍有冒頭即遭整治，嚴重阻滯了國民政治心智發育與公民人格養成。政治社會更是不見蹤影，導致中華國族的政治成熟捉襟見肘。但是，倫理社會基本恢復，經濟社會與市民社會確乎多所發育。市民自由而非公民自由，尤在市場經濟較為發達省份，早成生活事實。所謂市民生活及其市民自由，指的是私性領域的有限生活權利，着重於吃喝拉撒卿卿我我，特別是對於自家生活方式無涉政治的自我支配，至少是髮型服飾無需看官家臉色行事。大家搓澡搓腳，旅遊宴饗婚外戀，小資麻麻，這世道才有煙火氣。較諸毛氏極權政治下千篇一律的鐵桶生活，連褲襠都管得死死的，此刻國民暫棄公民身份追求，而滿足於市民幸福，回歸普通人的日常本色，既無可厚非，更是大家之能容忍刻下政體的原因所在。就此而言，警力以抓嫖為柄，實施定向人身控制，造成普遍不安全感，雖於一案一事得計，可喪失的卻是普遍的市民預期，反而得不償失。至於北京市以整治市容為據，而將好端端便民商鋪酒肆一律封拆，彰顯的是「光榮政治」對於市民社會的為所欲為，一種權力的美學惡趣。——就是香港、倫敦與巴黎，超大規模國際大都會，不還都容忍並規劃街市交易嘛。至於市場經濟之下，笑貧不笑娼與娛／愚樂至死，忸怩作態、無德無識無恥卻大富大貴，亦為普通眾生的市民生存，遵循的是商品邏輯，講述了一個不得不為了市民常態生聚而付出文明腐朽代價的現代喜劇與後現代鬧劇。
第四，實行政治任期制。三十多年裡，究其實質，雖說社會多元與政治容忍度明顯增長，但整個政治體制未見任何具有實質進步意義的變革，骨子裡依舊是那一套陳腐而殘忍的敵我鬥爭與專政理念，外加上「吃江山」的貪婪醜態。但因立憲規定了包括國家主席和國務總理在內的政治任期制，以及「人權入憲」，並經2003年以還的十年任期後實現黨內和平禪讓，終於兌現了最多連任兩屆、最長十年這一憲法規定，紙上的憲法規定至此似乎積習而為「憲法慣例」，好像立法與實踐均雙雙塵埃落地，這便總算給予國民以一定政治安全感，也令國際社會覺得中國正在步入現代政治。不妨說，三十多年裡嚷嚷政體改革而政體巋然不動，這是唯一看得見摸得着也拿得出手的政治改革成果。在大家看來，不管你如何，不過就是十年的事。諸位，百姓無辜，小民螻蟻，平時面朝黃土背朝天，分散如沙，為養家糊口而勞生息死，根本無力抵抗任何組織化強權。此刻終於好歹有此「十年任期」，似乎感覺也還算是對於隨時可能爆發的政治任性的一招制約，這便隨遇而安地打理自家油米柴鹽也。
綜上所述，總體來看，以治安為導向的社會控制，在提供治安這一基本公共產品層面，依然有效，但發展至「維穩」體制，局部地區甚至是一種準戒嚴狀態，則尾大不掉，靡費非常，說明體制潛力已然用盡，有待升級換代。特別是此次中美貿易戰爭，將國力的虛弱與制度軟肋暴露無遺，更加強化了不安全感。此前高峰申言，「執政合法性不是一勞永逸的」，對此危機似乎還有所警醒，而近年來對此嚴重缺乏敏感，卻自信膨脹，類如「扶貧運動」這種準運動式政經操作方式再度登場，令國家願景的確定性再度打折。另一方面，對於私有產權的有限保護與一般國民發家致富欲望的有限滿足，不僅促進了經濟增長，而且提升了億萬國民的生活水準，但卻終於遭遇所謂「國進民退」與實際生活中屢屢發生的公權力肆意剝奪私有產權惡性案件的證偽，倒逼出「私權神聖」這一國民訴求，而背後的邏輯不過是「權力不能私有，財產不能公有」這一公民認知。本來，「分清公私」方能「提供和平」，二者均為古今政治的基本內涵，今日於此必得過關而後安。而最為世詬病並令人膽戰心驚的，便是修憲取消政治任期制，等於一筆勾銷了三十多年的改革開放，一巴掌直要把中國打回那個令人恐懼的毛時代，伴隨着甚囂塵上而又可笑之至的領袖個人崇拜，這才引發出下列全面恐慌。
二、八種擔憂
在此，總括而言，大家的擔憂與恐慌，主要集中在下列八個方面。
第一，產權恐懼。幾十年裡積攢的財富，不管多少，能否保有？既有的生活方式能否持續？法定的產權關系還能獲得立法所宣諭的保障嗎？會不會因為得罪了哪位實權人物（包括村委會主任）就企業破產、家破人亡？凡此種種，最近幾年間，反倒隨着時間推移，而愈發缺乏確定性，遂至上上下下恐慌不已。它首先衝擊的是在改革開放大潮中已然掘金成功人士，而以大規模富人移民現像作為應對之道。一般中產階級中下層，溫飽有餘，但卻同樣為生老病死進程中隨時可能降臨的任何意外而擔驚受怕，尤其害怕通脹通縮錢不值錢。當然，富人移民的原因複雜，既有追求更高生活品質的，也不乏洗錢趕緊溜的，更有權貴攜款逍遙法外的，但普遍缺乏產權安全感則為通例。官商一體權貴的巧取豪奪是「改革開放」的最大贏家，也是富人移民的主體。官方信息披露有限，民間傳說嘈嘈切切，加上官媒時不時演奏個「共產黨的終極理想就是消滅私有制」之過門，伴隨着「打土豪分田地」式民粹叫囂，更且加劇了此種不安全感。恐慌之際，高峰居然集體學習《共產黨宣言》，一份曾令世界不得安生的兩位年輕天才的輕狂之作，其予全體國民的負面心理震撼，也只有在此語境下，才能獲得真切解釋。
第二，再次凸顯政治掛帥，拋棄以經濟建設為中心這一基本國策。幾年來，意識形態火藥味愈來愈濃，以爭奪話語權為標識，而實則依仗公權力施行意識形態迫害的陣勢，已然導致知識界的普遍恐慌。置此情形下，自我審查，層層加碼，導致出版業遭受重挫，輿論界鉗口日甚，中國與外部世界勾連之阻力加劇。甚至出現了鼓勵小朋友舉報告發父母這類官方宣傳品，違忤基本倫理，既反傳統又違現代，活脫脫一副極權政治嘴臉，令人不得不想起曾經的野蠻「文革」歲月，實在匪夷所思。影響所及，大學教師連連因言獲罪，因為擔憂黨政宣傳口子找麻煩與課堂上學生特務告密，而戰戰兢兢。更為嚴重的是，地方官僚基於政治擔憂普遍不作為，而中國經濟的成長實在有賴於地方官員基於政績觀而認真幹活的發展觀。那邊廂，「重慶模式」那幫餘孽與高校中曾經的「三種人」聯袂一體，今日搖身一變，滾雪球，構成「新極左」，喊打喊殺。
本來，一般國民對於「政治運動」之苦記憶猶新，新生代汲汲於市民生活，已然習慣於常態經濟社會與市民生活，對於人為的「政治掛帥」與毫無邏輯的極權泛政治化傾向，了無興趣，也不關心，硬逼他們，只能徒增反感。實際上，幾十年來，上下一心，這個政治體制還能獲得國民容忍，就在於國家以經濟建設為中心，全心全意謀發展，不再天天運動式「講政治」，停止或者減少干涉私人生活，更不會上演什麼「寧要社會主義草，不要資本主義苗」這類荒唐鬧劇。終究而言，「以經濟建設為中心」發展到一定階段，必需轉向以憲政建設為中心，而於政經兩面次第推進建設現代國族，為現代中國接生。但就目下而言，最低限度卻依然應該是固守前者，再謀他圖，豈能背道而馳。
第三，又搞階級鬥爭。前幾年官媒與官方意識形態主管官員屢提階級鬥爭，早已讓大家一陣恐慌。這幾年的施政方向，令人再度懷疑會否重搞斯大林—毛韶山氏階級鬥爭那一套。猶有甚者，隨着反腐之第次展開，特別是新建國家監察委及其權力之無限擴大，將全體公教人員悉數劃入，不僅未能提升大家基於法制的安全感，相反，卻不禁令人聯想到克格勃式轄制以及殘酷的黨內鬥爭的可能性，而再度引發重回過往階級鬥爭歲月的陣陣恐慌。因而，對於「鬥，鬥，鬥」這一恐怖政治模式的國民記憶，及其是否重回華夏大地的普遍擔憂，使得政治疏離感日增，和合與祥和氣氛日減。本來，「私產入憲」與「人權入憲」，伴隨着兩任到頂這一黨內禪讓制的施行，有望朝向一個常態國家漸行漸近，意味着不再需要動用「鬥」字訣，可這幾年的做法卻彷彿此背道而馳，大家自然心驚膽戰。
第四，再度關門鎖國，與以美國為代表的西方世界鬧僵，卻與朝鮮這類惡政打得火熱。中國的經濟成長與社會進步，是中國文明的自我進步，循沿的是超逾一個半世紀的文明大轉型固有邏輯，也是現代世界體系在中國落地後之發育成長，並非外力所能主導。但在具體操作層面，卻是在重啟「改革開放」而與西方世界關係改善之後，以進步主義為導向，以「與世界接軌」為目標，而搭乘上全球化市場經濟快車實現的。沒有「開放倒逼改革」，就沒有今天的中國經濟、社會和文化。而與朝鮮、委內瑞拉這類失敗國家、極權國家打得火熱，違背民意，忤逆歷史潮流，實在不智。雖說民間調侃，鑒於中國大量官商的子女玉帛均寄存於彼方山水，故而不用擔心兩國交惡，但明暗之間一閃失，倒霉的是這個據說全民所有的國族，而必然落在每個具體的百姓人頭，搖撼的是他們的口糧與衣衫。在此，究其緣由，就在於以政黨理性代替國家理性，而以扭曲的國家理性壓制公民理性，不思進取，一意孤行，早已落後於時代思潮，所以然哉，有以然哉。
第五，對外援助過量，導致國民勒緊褲腰帶。據說中國已成世界最大外援國，動不動「大手筆」劃拉幾十億幾百億。此就一個發展中人口大國而言，不少地方還處在前現代，實在是不自量力。究其根源，擴張性「光榮政治」邏輯作祟，蔚為主因，而公子哥心態與做派亦且難辭其咎。現有的國家財富，包括那三萬億外儲在內，是四十年裡幾代人血汗累積的，更是遠自洋務運動以還數代中國人奮鬥的善果，怎能隨便亂花。長期高速的經濟增長終有結束之時，則如此慷慨，類如當年無原則「支援亞非拉」，導致億萬國民勒緊褲腰帶過日子，甚至於餓殍遍野，在在不能重演。此次中美貿易戰爆發後官媒以「共克時艱」號令，儻論什麼「先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂而樂」，立刻遭遇百姓無情嘲諷，「去你媽的，都哪兒對哪兒呀」，正說明人心所向，早已非當年那般忽悠得了的了。
第六，知識分子政策左轉與施行思想改造。雖然早就說知識分子是勞動人民的一部分，但一有風吹草動就拿他們當外人，甚至當敵人，已成國朝政治的最佳晴雨表，也是政制底色的政治表達。教育部一再聲言要加強對教師的思想教育，網傳必須重點防範海歸教師，以及高校中的極少數文革遺左紛紛如打雞血般跳將出來喊打喊殺等等，都令人擔憂所謂的知識分子改造政策再度降臨，特別是伴隨着政策左轉而再次施行思想改造運動，乃至於不排除更為嚴重的態勢。「妄議」大棒揮舞，人人噤若寒蟬，還有什麼言論自由可言。而無自由思想與獨立精神，則探索未知、學術精進與思想創發雲乎哉。本來，歷經這四十年的積累奮鬥，再好好幹一、兩代人，中華文明有望迎來一個思想學術的全盛高峰。但是，假若此種鉗口政策再延續下去，甚至日益趨緊，則此種可能性無望變成現實性，中華國族終究只是精神侏儒與文明小國。
第七，陷入重度軍備競賽與爆發戰爭，包括新冷戰。短短十年間，整個東亞其實已然陷入軍備競賽，但所幸爆發戰爭的概率依舊尚處可控層面。問題是，不能由此打斷中國的常規發展，就此摧折了尚未最後水落石出的偉大現代轉型。兩年來，在「阻止中國陷入全面內戰」與「保衛改革開放」兩文中，筆者都曾指認中國逐漸於「維穩體制」之上又疊加了「戰備體制」，就在於提示其危險性，防範其負面影響。此刻隨着內政緊繃與外貿糾紛日甚，經濟下滑可能性加劇，則其進程不可控因素增多，防範其不至被迫走向戰爭狀態，不管是熱戰還是冷戰，絕非杞人憂天。坊間輿議提醒中美貿易爭端不應再引向意識形態之爭，更不要進行政治模式之爭，亦為同此憂慮而發，還算靠譜。
第八，改革開放終止與極權政治全面回歸。雖說「改革」一詞已然多少污名化，畢竟，惡政亦且假爾之名而行之，但在當下中國語境下，置身大轉型尚未完成、有待臨門一腳的現狀，較諸爆炸性革命與極左式的倒退，改革依舊是最為穩妥的路徑。改革空轉，抑或不進則退，早已非只近幾年的事了，實已延綿一屆任期。照此趨勢以往，「改革開放」會否就此終止，極權回歸，亦未可知。此時此刻，全體國民之最大擔憂，莫此為甚。說是極權回歸，就在於胡溫任期，彷彿出現極權向威權過渡趨勢，故而稱為「後極權時代全能型威權政制」。但這兩年反其道而行之，這才引發「極權政治全面回歸」的恐慌。中國近代史上，1894年的甲午戰爭與1937年抗戰爆發，兩度打斷中國的現代進程，致使追求日常政治的努力付諸東流，中國的現代事業因而被迫延宕。今日這一波延綿將近兩個世紀的大轉型已到收尾時段，有待臨門一腳，切切不能再因戰禍而中斷。倘若中斷，下次歷史機遇何時再來，恐伊於胡底矣。
三、八項期待
當此之際，針對上述擔憂與恐慌，從內政着眼，無涉經貿（包括大幅度減稅），也不上綱上線到民主法治層面，僅就下列八項而言，具體而有形，允為時務。
第一，杜絕援外撒錢「大手筆」。非必要的無謂援外大撒把，砸錢，最令一般民眾反感寒心。中國尚處發展爬坡時段，無論基礎設施還是民生福利，均難題如山，任重道遠。且不說養老、就業與教育，但就鄉村凋敝而言，就壓力山大，而需公權力多所措意。否則，半個中國仍處前現代，等於現代中國只是個半拉子工程，談何文明復興。近日中阿論壇期間宣布撥銀兩百億美金，設立所謂阿拉伯國家「重建專項計劃」，並且「探討實施總額為10億元人民幣的項目，支持有關國家維穩能力建設」。可我們知道，海灣國家個個富得流油，何需尚有上億未曾脫貧國民的中國在此充當冤大頭，讓人不禁感慨有司心腸何在，還把自家國民當人待嗎？而且，凡此支出，完全無視既有預決算體制，將最高國家權力機關的國庫司庫憲法職權撇在一旁，在實質性癱瘓既有官僚科層建制化之際，等於向憲制與法制開戰。
第二，杜絕主場外交中的鋪張浪費。開個平常的會，就使勁折騰，不計成本，勞民傷財，其實既無裡子也無面子。此為「光榮政治」，而非「實利政治」，更非「實力政治」，亦非什麼「中國人民自古以來具有熱情好客的優良傳統」，非徒謀虛榮者不為。照此思路，聯合國所在地的紐約峨冠博帶，豈非天天戒嚴不可；全球性組織最多的日內瓦和巴黎，衣香鬢影，還不夜夜都要放煙火。就國家自助體而言，概需以實力立世，而旨在謀取實利，同時不廢道義心腸。兩項既存，三者並立，沾溉國民，榮光不求自來。無此維度，汲汲於光榮政治那一套，當事者出頭露面好像挺風光，而不恤民力，做冤大頭，實則招人鄙夷，也會激發民憤。連舉世嫌棄的隔壁獨夫胖墩來，居然大陣仗迎送，那文圖俱在、傳聞中酒席宴上128萬元一瓶的矮嘴茅台，說實在的，一下子令億萬國民離心離德。——還中國夢呢，做夢吧！
第三，取消退休高幹的權貴特權。國朝體制，高幹生養病死全賴國庫，而享受超國民待遇。原有生活待遇、醫療標準與渡假休養諸項，耗費巨量民脂民膏，大家耳聞目睹，而至今不敢公布，正說明見不得人。此種體制，承繼的是朱姓子民、八旗子弟的奉養傳統，既違忤曾經自詡之革命精神，更不符現代公民立國原則。若說什麼「封建殘餘」，此為典型。國民痛恨不已，可毫無辦法，遂成制度招恨之一大毒瘤。這邊廂普通人民住院難，那邊廂高幹病房巍哉峨兮，隔離於一般病區，讓多少百姓看在眼裡恨在心裡，而每一絲仇恨都可能在某個時刻於心田中成長為驚天雷暴。
第四，取消特供制度。七十多年裡，其實早從延安時期就已開始，無論是在國民飢寒交迫的年代裡，還是此刻億萬百姓為嬰兒奶品、日常食品安全而提心吊膽之際，特供制度供養着這個號稱人民政權的高層權貴，提供着一般人做夢都不敢想像的諸種特權，除開幾個極權政體之外，舉世找不出第二家，可謂豪奢之至，而無恥之尤。社會恆有差等，賢愚貧富實為自然，但那是結果，而非抹煞起點平等的公民理想，更非公然利用國庫供養少數權貴。此制一日不除，「第34號」依舊，中國食品安全就一日沒有保障，兩方同樣無任何真正的安全可言。
第五，實施官員財產陽光法案。有關於此，民間早已呼籲多年，居然毫無動靜，說明其間貓膩最大，最見不得人。現有官員升遷程序中對於子女玉帛的說明，只限內部掌握，存見於幹部檔案，而一般國民無從知曉，遂使一切迷霧重重。而無論人力物力，還是技術手段，早已成熟，正為施行此制，並經由全國聯網，用十四億雙眼睛施行有效監督，鋪墊好一切基礎。反腐而腐敗不止，就在於搞成了內部的事，而非基於政治公開原則的法制作業，缺的就是陽光法案這一環。你們若非心虛，那就施行此制，讓一切大白於天下吧！你們要是正心誠意，那就加入大多數國家均在其中的《艾格蒙國際反洗錢組織》吧！何必雲山霧罩，將億萬國民當二百五。
第六，「個人崇拜」亟需趕緊剎車。改革開放四十年，沒想到神州大地再度興起領袖個人崇拜。黨媒造神無以復加，儼然一副前現代極權國家的景像。而領袖像重現神州，高高掛起，彷彿神靈，平添詭異。再者，官員講話，本為秘書手筆，不過等因奉此，居然彙編刊行，精裝亮相，全球免費贈送，徒耗紙張，令人噴飯。此間不僅需要反思為何當事人如此弱智而好名，更需要檢討為何曾經遭遇此種戕害的偌大國家，包括她的芸芸「理論家」「研究者」，居然對此毫無抵抗力，卻不乏舔癰吸疽之徒。而億萬人猶如虛無，竟然容忍其大行其道，奈何不了那幾個馬屁精大員，正說明所謂啟蒙是一個未竟事業，需要每一代人在公共事務上公開運用自己的理性，方能如履如臨而砥礪前行。而且，它更加說明中國尚未完全進入現代世俗理性的常態國家境界，而有待接續奮鬥矣。
第七，恢復國家主席任期制。年初修憲，取消政治任期，令世界輿論嘩然，讓國人膽戰心驚，頓生「改革四十年，一覺回從前」的憂慮。此間作業，等於憑空製造一個「超級元首」，無所制衡，令人不禁浮想聯翩而頓生恐懼。因此，今明兩年的適當時機，如秋季召開人大特別會議或者明年三月全國人大例會，通過再度修憲，恢復國家主席任期制，以保衛改革開放、防範重回文革極權政治。《憲法》既立，無論是何種質量的憲法，本不宜改來改去，無奈這是大轉型時段過渡政體下的一部臨時憲法，只好頻繁修訂。但願轉型落地之前，這是最後一次修憲。
第八，平反「六四」。今明兩年，適值「改開」四十周年、「五四」百年與「六四」三十周年，一連串所謂敏感節點紛沓。而中美貿易戰的後果，亦將延時第次顯現，增加了所謂的不確定性。在此，既有的「維穩」思路是「以治安對付政治」，疊加上「用政制鉗制政治」，而非「以政治迎應政治」這一常態政治之道。當年給「四五」平反，從此每年四月五號不再成為敏感節點，就在於「以政治迎應政治」，兵來將擋水來土掩，結果各得其所，皆大歡喜。因此，值此迎來「六四」爆發三十周年之際，當局於今明兩年適當時刻公開為其平反，不僅表明「以政治迎應政治」的誠意與智慧，而且，從此每年六月四號無需再如臨大敵，為全體公民政治上的和平共處掃清障礙，既裨益於民心舒暢，更有助於收拾政治合法性。
以上諸項，均為現代政治的一般常識，也是刻下國人的普遍訴求。此番「冒着殺頭的危險說出人所共知的道理」，就在於舉世滔滔，若無此說法，就無此立法，從而吾儕百姓沒個活法，其奈也何，嗚呼哀哉！
四、過渡時段
兩年多來的世界進入政治調整小周期，無需驚恐，遠未到分曉時分，更須也唯有穩健推行內政改革，健全國族身心，方能應對過關，維持包括中國在內的這艘世界大船持續揚帆於和平與發展的常態政治航道。衝突與戰爭是人類這個殘忍物種的常態，但是身處歷史機遇關頭而推延或者避免其發生，則為政治的天命所在，更是對於肉食者政治智慧與德性的大考，而人類恰恰就是政治的動物，政治為世間最高智慧。就刻下情形而言，縱便事態已如今日，也還未能根本偏轉「和平與發展」這一大勢。而這就是歷史機遇，就是所謂的「機遇期」，唯智者方能攫獲，而不至於東懟西懟，將一手好牌打成爛牌也。
至於太平洋沿岸東西兩大國均不期然間先後步入「老紅衛兵執政」狀態，是而且不過是一種短暫的過渡現像，實為每臨歷史危機關頭就會出現的那種一再上演的亂像之再現而已。就此岸言，其毫無歷史感與現代政治意識，更無基於普世文明自覺的道義擔當，昧於時勢大道，卻又深濡文革政治烙印，虛驕之下，允為幹才而用力過猛卻用錯了方向，致使弄權有術，當官有方，而治國無道，豈止折騰，直是倒行逆施。就彼岸看，實為一群依舊生活在列強時代與冷戰政治中的老不死幽靈登台，雖不乏對於當今世界政治圖景與文明變局的現實判斷，卻同樣缺乏歷史感，短視而貪婪，根本開出了誤診處方，反將早年裙帶資本權貴的重商主義國策與基於唯我獨尊、掠奪成性的帝國主義式傲慢偏見與粗鄙蠻橫，赤裸裸的訛詐，盡興抖露無遺，展示了一個文明衰敗的疲憊帝國狗急跳牆式的晚期症狀。而自大愛國狂適成禍國害人精，所謂愛國賊，中外古今，史不鮮見。同時，它還說明，如同「壞人變老了」一般，人人都是自己早年教育體系的產物，此後無所用心，了無自省，便難以掙脫羈絆。以舊知識應對新事物，卻又自信爆棚，遂剛愎自用。其理念，其政策，如托克維爾所言，不過是「發霉的舊貨」。
此時此刻，就中文世界的一般輿議心態與脈絡來看，基於公民理性的政治自覺已然充沛發育，更不缺昂揚正大的道義立場，但少見基於國家理性意識的文明自覺，特別是未能梳理清楚適用於「國家間政治」的國家理性與適用於「國家政治」的公民理性之二元分際，而混戰一團，指東打西，甚至崇拜起彼岸老紅衛兵來，將自己降格到鐵鏽州紅脖子們的水準，套用一句名人名言，可謂「土樣土尿泡」。同時，也是政體感召不足，導致認同缺失或者疲弱，而使國民身份與公民認同兩相悖逆之怪像。畢竟，「大清」與「中華」，雖糾結纏繞，還就真的不是一回事。你們「坐江山」「吃江山」，江山有事了，就讓大家「共克時艱」來「保江山」，這不扯淡嗎！有輿議感慨，一些人說話辦事，彷彿自己不是中國人，而處處倒為對方設計着想，實在是怪而不怪，正為向心力凝聚力這一軟實力不足國族常見的景像矣。再者，撇開究竟何為「中國人」等等認知爭議，置此情形下，可得申言者，兩邊各說各話，越是昂揚正大，越可能將話談死，而無轉圜餘地。凡此再度說明，國族的政治成熟必以其知識精英的心智作育為先導，而心智作育要在精神自由，眾口喧嘩卻又緊扣人生與人心的普世心思，摒拒任何定於一尊的愚妄與傲慢，要求當局不要再鉗口日甚，而把言論自由還給讀書人，從而，在幾代人的接續用功磨礪中，涵養保育中華文明思想母機，護衛其功用，強化其勢能，這才有望清醒觀勢，冷靜應事，而清明用世矣。
目前來看，當局一再重申絕不會因為貿易戰而改變「改革開放」的基本國策，也不會動搖在開放交往中發展經濟的既有路線，並決心協力捍衛多邊體制。與此表態相呼應，並有相應開放措施出台，彷彿尚有定力。其於證明「開放倒逼改革」這一中國式發展路徑依賴的同時，卻又似乎未見任何實質性內政改革，雷聲大雨點小，則不免令人失望，而對其誠意和實效，採取游移觀望態度。故而，上述八項，允為時務，先做起來再說。
都說你能幹肯幹，這八項你只要幹一件，我們就歡喜。你要是幹三、四件，我們就心服口服。你要是全幹了，則普天同慶。
年初高官曾經宣示今年還要陸續放大招，以回應「改革開放」四十周年，此刻時間過半，寧信其有，且翹首以待矣。
最後，順說一句，陝西省梁家河村四五十戶人家，常駐百十來口，居然在上海設立聯絡處和農副產品展示館，一望可知非淳樸鄉民所能為，毋寧，官商勾結的媚上雙簧，於各懷襟抱中各逞其圖。還有，最高檢開設「12309檢察服務中心」，層峰邀約與此八竿子打不到一塊兒的梁家河村支書共同揭牌，同屬太監姿態，希圖借此創造勾兌機會，拍馬屁不要臉。至於陝西省社科聯的招標項目「梁家河大學問」，以及近年來各類所謂社科項目之造神運動與領袖崇拜，反現代，逆潮流，匪夷所思，恬不知恥，丟人現眼，更不論矣！凡此種種，太作了，太過分了，而過猶不及，只會把我們帶回那個人人觳觫苟存的酷烈人世也！
話說完了，生死由命，而興亡在天矣。
2018年7月
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魏京生基金会及中国民主运动海外联席会议以推动中国的人权与民主为己任。
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