Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition News and Article Release Issue: A34-M4

中国民主运动海外联席会议新闻与文章发布号：A34-M4

Release Date: October 25, 2003

发布日：2003年10月25日

Topic: Refocus Global Attention to China’s Political Transformation（Fang, Jue）

标题：中国的转型与全球战略重点的再转移 (方觉)

After the War on Terror: Refocusing Global Attention to China's Political Transformation

By Fang Jue

Aug 1, 2003

(Research report written at the Fairbank Center

for East Asian Research, Harvard University)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, world attention shifted to  Communist China with curious expectation.  However, the next decade would prove disappointing for those hoping for the transformation of the last powerful communist regime: while the Party lifted some constraints on the economy, its political repression continued.  The Chinese government used political detainees as bargaining chips with the international community, releasing prisoners as symbolic gestures in return for concessions from western nations. 

However, all that changed as American foreign policy altered irrevocably after the terrorist attacks on September 11^th, 2001.  While the world concerns itself with fighting international terrorism over the next several years, it also must struggle to formulate a workable China-policy.  Since the Cold War ended over a decade ago, it has been hard to identify the dynamics of the new world order that will drive the next few decades -- but it will be a fight to end international terrorism and a fight to bring real, transparent democracy to China.

1. China's Transformation As Compared to the Soviet Union's Perestroika:

In the era of glasnost and perestroika there were readily identifiable criteria used to measure the transformation of the East European communist countries and former Soviet Union.

However, it seems we have fewer expectations when pressing for the transformation of China.  This is puzzling:  there are no essential differences between Chinese communism and that of the Soviet Union and its allies in the East European bloc.  Therefore, it would seem commonsensical to evaluate the democratic transformation of China by using the exact criteria we used in judging the success of the former Soviet Union.

Therefore, China's transformation must include the at least the following two criteria:

1)      Initiate the real process of democracy.  The communists need legalize political opposition parties and allow democratic elections.  Leaders at all levels of government, as well as representatives for the people's congresses, need to be elected through free and direct general elections.

2)      Privatize the state-owned enterprises on a grand scale.  Privately-owed enterprises should be allowed to participate in all economic sectors, and a free market economy based on private enterprises should be established.

Based on these essential criteria, China has not yet had an actual transformation. 

After the collapse of European communism in 1991, it is noteworthy to state that the goal of Chinese leaders has not been to learn from the democratic transformations that took place.  Instead, in the guise of preventing economic chaos, their sustained goal has been to prevent a Chinese brand of perestroika from breaking out across the mainland.

Even as recently as the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP )last autumn, Chinese leaders publicly reiterated the solemn duty of the Party to guide China in the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Excerpts from the statements of Jiang Zemin's address emphasized the necessity of the Party guiding the state. 

1)      "From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, there occurred serious political disturbances in China, drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Socialism in the world suffered serious setbacks. China was faced with unprecedented difficulties and pressure in its efforts to develop the socialist cause. At this historical juncture bearing on the destiny of the Party and state, the Party Central Committee successfully brought the overall situation of reform and development under control and safeguarded the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics…"

2)      "The Party exercises leadership over the state and society…"

" Party committees, playing the role as the core of leadership among all other

organizations at corresponding levels…"

" In ensuing that the Party's views become the will of the state and that

candidates recommended by Party organizations become leading cadres of

the organs of state power…"

3) " We must uphold Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng

       Xiaoping Theory as our guidelines in the realm of ideology…"

4) " There must be no wavering in upholding the fundamental principle and

        system that the Party leads the people's army.”

5)  " It is necessary to consolidate and develop unswervingly the public sector of

        the economy. Expansion of the state sector and its control of the lifeline of

        the national economy…" 1

It needs to be pointed out that the new leaders unanimously agreed with this conservative stance.

While hope accompanies a change in leadership, especially in an autocratic regime, the new leaders that have emerged in China since November 2002 have clearly tipped their hands regarding in several instances:

·        In the first half of 2003, the human rights’ situation right in China has not progressed; in fact it has worsened. There are increasing numbers of dissidents who are being tried and imprisoned, and adherents to religious and labor movements are suffering persecution continuously.  The promises that China made to the international community to improve its human rights' record have gone unrealized. 2

·        In the spring of 2003, when the international SARS epidemic originated in South China, the Chinese government initially suppressed media reports on the outbreak. When the international media made this story impossible to suppress domestically, the Chinese government relented and gave its consent to the media.  Instead of using this opportunity to increase transparency the government dealings and increase the freedom of the media, after SARS left the worldwide headlines media controls have been put back in place by the government.   

·        The CCP's new general secretary Hu Jintao, gave an important address commemorating the founding of the Communist Party on July 1, 2003.  In this speech Hu made not a single mention of political reform, contrary to the forecasts optimistic Western and Chinese observers had made. Hu reaffirmed in each instance the conservative policies of his predecessor.3

·        Also on July 1 this year over 500,000 Hong Kong residents demonstrated against Article 23, a security measure that would violate both personal and political freedoms.  In protesting Article 23, they went a step further and asked for democracy in Hong Kong.  Less than three weeks after the demonstration, however, New President Hu Jintao and new Premier Wen Jiabao made known their collective position: Article 23 must be implemented in Hong Kong.  Toward this end the Chinese government will continue to support a Hong Kong chief executive who has lost the support of the Hong Kong people, and the government in Beijing continues to delay the progress of democracy in Hong Kong.

Although the ruling clique disagrees on some minor issues, there is in fact no opposition on the main issues. It would be hard to imagine any sound forces arising within the leadership that would push forward the transformation of China.

2. China's Strategic Position

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, by promoting both the economy and nationalistic feelings the Chinese communist regime has continually deflected the calls of the people for democracy.  This has a dual purpose.  Because it regards America and its democratic allies as its main rivals, China views rapid economic and military growth as essential to bolster its strategic position.  A quick overview will show how China engages nations in its sphere of influence:

·        In Northeast Asia: China is the main (if not sole) supporter of North Korea. China props up the North Korea regime to create a strategic front in Northeast Asia to tie up the forces of America and its allies.

·        In the Taiwan Strait: China's military threatens Taiwan.  This not only cows independence-minded Taiwanese, but also weakens American prestige in Asia. When tension grows in the Taiwan Strait, China uses this as a bargaining chip to persuade America to concede on other issues.

·        In Southeast Asia: China's military encroaches upon disputed islands in the South China Sea in order to punish countries who would align themselves too closely with America.  In Southeast Asia China also supports the military dictatorship in Burma.  It thus creates uses aggression to create "allies" or buffers in Southeast Asia that will help it oppose democracy and the West.

·        In South Asia: China supports the Pakistan military dictatorship in developing its nuclear and missile programs. The purpose is to encourage Pakistan to distance itself from the West and use Pakistan to as a buffer against India, whose success with democracy creates a growing regional competition to China. 

·        In Central Asia: The new Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a consortium of China, Russia, and other former Soviet republics, wields influence to counterbalance the interests of democratic countries.

·        In the Middle East: China supports theocracy and missile development in Iran and proliferates sensitive technology and goods through aid to Syria and Libya. China also supported Iraq's former dictatorship over a long period of time.

·        In Russia: China and Russia cooperate to restrain America from playing too large of a leading role in the world.  This cooperation serves mutually to bolster the influence of Russia and China in the international community.

After the cold war, the fundamental strategic policy of China has been to defend its one-party autocracy and to obstruct the new world order set forth by America.  Therefore, China has consistently opposed “American hegemony” by advocating a multi-polar world with regional powers, be they autocratic countries or democratic countries.  To this end, China has pressed forward with military preparation, striving for the ability to overwhelm opponents in regional wars with superior technology.

3. The Domestic Factors for Democratic Transformation in China

 It is unlikely that other circumstances arising in China could hasten the transformation along independently.  There are several factors that could influence it, however:

1) Private Entrepreneurs and A Market Economy

While some people believe that the growth of private entrepreneurs and a market economy will eventually of themselves lead China to freedom and democracy, this view is too simple.

To a great degree, the existence and growth of private enterprises in China relies on the protection of officials in the communist regime, as well as their permission and favor. This is especially true for the growth of large-scale private enterprises, as they vie for public resources (such as land, loan, stock, etc.) controlled by government officials.  In order to survive and grow, the majority of private entrepreneurs tend to favor the communist regime over democracy.  Well-funded private entrepreneurs keep close to the Chinese communist regime in order to hook in officials. A few recently exposed relationships between well-known entrepreneurs and corrupt, high-ranking officials typify the actual political attitude of Chinese private entrepreneurs.

There has been an obvious growth in China's market economy during the past 25 years. However, China has not completely implemented a free market economy. The communist regime still dominates the main economic resources (monopolies in key industries, banks, important sources of energy and raw materials, etc.,) and state-owned enterprises still play the leading role. Some economic planning and economic policies by the state still determine the direction of the Chinese economy.  The bottom line is this: the communist regime is neither willing to allow private enterprises become the main engine driving the Chinese economy, nor it is willing to give up its state controls on main economic activities.  If it were to do so, the regime might lose its economic foundation, thus shaking its political power.

Take a look at recent history as an indicator.  Among the former communist countries, there is no single country which relied on the growth of private enterprise and expansion of the market economy, to create political change in the system. On the contrary, former communist nations all implemented democratic reforms first.  Only after democracy had created an atmosphere of transparency and openness did they open the door towards privatization and a market economy.  Because totalitarian political system controls the economic system in every communist nation, there can be no fundamental change in the economic system without first a change in the political system. That is why there are no apparent signs that weak private entrepreneurs or the limited market economy is having a noticeable impact in the political transformation of China.

2) Intellectuals

There are very few Chinese intellectuals who openly embrace liberalism and democracy. Even if there were, because of oppression from the communist regime, it would be very hard for them to broaden their influence and take political action.

The regime is effective at placing constraints even on intellectuals.  Because the regime holds a monopoly on both education and the media, a minority of intellectuals has sufficient access to the wealth of information or new ideas.  This severely limits intellectual development, spiritual growth, and the knowledge that political options do exist. 

Furthermore, many intellectuals can only find work at organizations controlled either directly or indirectly by the communist regime. This forces them to accept official ideology simply in order to survive. 

Because providing for themselves and their families distracts many intellectuals, the regime also entices their loyalty in practical ways.  Proven loyalty commands a relatively high salary, a nicer living environment, more opportunities for acclaim, and status that are more important. These kinds of rewards are some effective. From the 1990s onward, some intellectuals have become active supporters and defenders of the Chinese communist regime in order to pursue personal ends.

Above all, we must not overestimate the potential that Chinese intellectuals have to promote the transformation of China. 

3) A Phenomenon Worth  Noticing - Labor Movement

A budding labor movement is beginning to emerge in China. In over a dozen demonstrations, groups of thousands or even tens of thousands of people have congregated to protest.  On a smaller scale protests occur more frequently. 

There are two major components to China's labor movement: poor workers from the city and poor farmers from the countryside. There are over one hundred million workers in the cities, and an estimated 1/3 of them are unemployed or under-employed. There are nearly nine hundred million farmers living in the countryside, with over two hundred million living below the poverty line. The potential strength of a labor movement dazzles the imagination.

Although a labor organizer might dream of combining the workers and the farmers for common good, they often have different goals. Workers in the cities are primarily concerned with finding secure employment or collecting welfare benefits when unable to do so.  Farmers in the countryside are concerned with ridding themselves of peremptory orders, unreasonable fees, and inconsistent government policies.   Due to the expanding gap between the rich and poor in China, relief for the poor and unemployed will be far from adequate.  Government corruption and incompetence will exacerbate this; hence, there will likely be more and more labor protests in China.

Labor movements force communist regimes into an embarrassing situation, because they cannot suppress protests joined by large numbers of the working class.  Their only recourse is to go after the leaders, in order to deter those who would lead other protests.  In May 2003, the Chinese government sentenced two labor leaders who led tens of thousands of workers to demonstrate in Northeast China.  The leaders were sentenced to four and seven years' imprisonment, respectively. This should not be an effective deterrent to the desperately poor who are living at the rock bottom of society.  Despite the sentencing, labor protests still occurred in several cities after the government's warning.  This indicates there is room for a vital labor movement in China.

The Chinese government strictly forbids independent labor unions or farmer organizations in order to restrain labor movements. Because there is no way to form a variety of independent labor organizations which can support and cooperate with each other, the Chinese labor movement cannot not possibly coordinate protests on a scale that would influence political policy.  

4) Another Positive Phenomenon - More Freedom of Religion

The activities of Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, who belong to underground churches are especially meaningful. It is estimated there are more than ten million of Christians who participate in these churches. This enables some Chinese to form a link with mainstream western civilization through their religion.

Religious movements deconstruct the communist system to a certain degree in two ways.  By belief in a higher authority, Christians shake off stale communist ideology.  Too, it drives Christians to try to establish direct links with religious institutions and figures in the West, such as the Vatican.  

Chinese communist regime has continuously oppressed independent Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, and sometimes imprisons dedicated members of the clergy. However, people who hold dear to faith usually overcome their fear, so that intimidation by a communist regime is less effective than otherwise might be.

The Chinese communist regime effectively restrains religious freedom by forbidding Chinese Christians from openly forming independent Chinese churches.   The regime also forbids direct contact with the hierarchies of numerous branches of Christianity, including the Vatican. Before the Chinese communist regime ends this prohibition, the deconstruction that religious movements play on communist system will be very limited.

5) Minority Autonomy

If you note that the areas where China's largest minorities live (Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia), you will see that they account for more than half of China's territory.  Furthermore, they were consolidated into China Proper in modern times.  These facts convey some of the complications surrounding the issue of autonomy for minorities of China. 

In Tibet a national movement arose over 40 years ago and has gained support of an overwhelming majority of Tibetans.  A government-in-exile, led by the Dalai Lama, is seeking real autonomy for Tibet.

The Islamic minority nationalities (there are several distinct groups) are increasingly dissatisfied about what they see as intrusions.  They are beginning to protest for increased political rights, and for more priorities given to their economic interests and cultural heritage.

Mongolians also feel deep concern about increasing resettlement of Han Chinese in their traditional homeland in Inner Mongolia. 

Although the Chinese communist regime has applied constant pressure to thwart the minorities clamoring for more autonomy, their calls continue. This weakens the communist regime by creating a whole exocentric force, which detests the regime in wide areas of the countryside. The Chinese government potentially faces widespread instability in its vast borderlands.  

The minorities, however, have no route to autonomy; the communist regime obviously possesses a ridiculous advantage in economic and military power.

4. The External Factors for the Transformation of China

So far, those external factors, which might affect the transformation of China, seem not to have played any significant roles.

1)      Foreign Policies of the West Linked to China's Record of Human Rights

In a country such as America, our foreign policy should reflect our values of human rights.  This means that we should link our foreign policy with each nation to democratic values.  For without democratic reforms, the condition of human rights will not have any basic improvement, as the root of human rights' violations is an autocratic system. 

If there is no democratic goal for American's human right policy toward China, it will weaken the actual role greatly in China.

For many years, the main achievement in the human rights' arena has been to persuade China to release a few well-known political prisoners. Nevertheless, this has not come without cost to the West; in fact, the West has had to concede quite a bit to China in order to obtain releases for these prisoners. 

The Chinese communist regime does not plan to improve the actual human rights' condition in China; it primarily uses these issues to horsetrade with America and its allies.  When the well-known political activists are released, the Chinese government actively seeks to arrest new "notable" political activists.  To secure their release America then has to provide new concessions to China. Thus, we are stuck in a vicious circle that benefits the Chinese government. China endlessly creates "notable political prisoners", and America continuously make efforts to rescue them and by making concessions to China.  Thus, the human rights' condition in China has not shown any reversal or substantial improvement.

The Chinese government knows the key to the issue of human rights issues  is democracy, and it will not make a fundamental concession on democracy. Therefore, America should leave no stone unturned until it forces China to atone for more than a few, limited cases of individual political prisoners.  

2) The Uncertain Effects of Investment and Trade on China

It is still not very clear how much western investment and trade will affect the democratic transformation of China.

When the international community agreed to China's entrance into World Trade Organization (WTO), China was not required to immediately privatize state industries nor completely implement a free market economy.  There was also no prerequisite for political transformation.  This is peculiar to the history of WTO.

Without doubt, western trade and investment have played a constructive role in expanding the market economy in China, notably improving the standard of living, too. However, as the communist regime will not allow domestic private enterprises the free competition to develop competitive advantages, it will certainly not allow fair competition between foreign enterprises and the state-owned monopolies in key industries. Furthermore, it will restrict the flow of foreign capital and goods into Chinese market in the long run. The rationale behind the lack of free and fair competition is that the communist regime wants to ensure its political influence by controlling the Chinese economy.

In some ways the foreign investment and trade with China plays into the hands of the regime. For example, many foreign ventures in China do not have labor unions or only allow a branch from a government-affiliated labor union. As another example, some foreign enterprises acquiesce to the CCP by establishing party branches inside their organization. In these regards foreign investment neither encourage the formation of the independent labor union nor restrain the totalitarianism of Chinese communist system.

It is worth reflecting upon that foreign corporations are building joint ventures and cooperative enterprises with state-owned companies (sometimes with fronts for the People’s Liberation Army) that unmistakably lend strength to the communist regime. Sensitive equipment and technology transfers that western enterprises export to China directly help China improve its national defense and develop its military technology. The American government has punished some well-known American corporations individually for this kind of conduct.4 However, the cases exposed and investigated may, in the real world, just be the tip of the iceberg. 

The explicit aid U.S companies give to the Chinese Communist regime in order to aid repression is startling.  China restricts Internet access more than any country in the world, and the police has hired large numbers of high-tech professionals to monitor Internet activity.  However, China has not been able to develop efficient technology quickly enough both to monitor the Internet and to filter out undesired content. Therefore, a large portion of the equipment and key technology that China uses to monitor the Internet is purchased from American companies.5  This is a bitter contradiction:  When Chinese people who long for freedom and democracy search for the news and information coming from the West, American companies turn a blind eye to ethics and sell tools for the Chinese government to limit the freedom of the media and the exchange of information.

Some American companies certainly benefit from investing in and trading with China. China's low wages attract a great amount of foreign investment to set up factories that export cheap goods back to America.  This is the one side of the coin. The other side of the coin has been the loss of jobs and profits in America's manufacturing industry, as it cannot cost-wise compete with the goods made in China.  Even as America's trade deficit with China has surpassed $100 billion, there are still lobbies in Washington who exaggerate the active role that China's booming economy plays in transforming China politically.  A few special interest groups seem to posses too much influence in forming America's foreign policy to China.

3) The Hopes in Cultural Exchange

Increasing numbers of Chinese students and scholars have gone to study and research in

the West, causing hope that through these cultural exchanges the then-westernize Chinese

professionals will return to China to become leading force in the transformation.  

As a matter of fact, the results have not been necessarily encouraging.

The Chinese sent by the communist regime to study and research in the West are commonly vetted. They often identify with communism or nationalism. They are sent mainly for the purpose of grasping advanced science and technology or useful management skills in order to serve better the communist regime when they come back to China.

Of course, many more Chinese come to study in the West through non-government channels. The majority of them are interested in earning degrees, income and residency in the West (through a resident certificate or citizenship). Instead of thinking about how to help China become a democratic and free society, many become westernized to the point they no longer wish to return to China.

Those Chinese who return to China to start their own business under the encouragement of the Chinese government often fall prey to the corrupt nature of Chinese business practices. Instead of actively promoting fair competition, honest and clean administration, and the rule by law in China, quite a few of them praise the communist regime in exchange for special benefits.

Without doubt, the idea of freedom and democracy is an uplifting influence on those Chinese who have gone to study, work or visit the West. This will play a certain role in helping to transform China. However, there is no evidence to show they may be an important political and social strength for the democratic transformation of China.

5. Next Global Strategic Emphasis

As long as leaders in China view transformation negatively, other domestic factors in China that might effect its transformation are not powerful enough. Too, the external factors might effect the transformation of China are not effectively wielded.

If China can not be transformed in the long run, one fifth of the world people will be deprived of basic freedom and democracy.  Furthermore, the Chinese communist regime will to oppose the post-Cold War world order America and its allies are creating.

While the international community nearly as one has correctly turned its attention to combating terrorism, with continued dedication and unity we have reason to believe successes will be won in a few years.  When that time comes, and the world has sufficient resources both to combat terrorism and to return to another agenda, communist China will be still there.  Communist China will be the only world power with the strength and political will to resist democratic states.  At that time, it will be necessary for the international community to regain its urgency about the transformation of China.

The collapse of Soviet Union and the East European communist bloc created an expectation that China, too, could be transformed, that it would be transformed by freedom-loving people in China and the world.  We have waited a long time with little result.  New and urgent priorities have emerged, and the tasks of eliminating international terrorism and disarming rogue states loom large.  When successes are won and allies lend generous support to the causes, America can then divert resources to other needs. This is an unprecedented historical opportunity to end communism and totalitarianism after the Cold War.

A global strategy to transform China into democracy could be built on three basic points:

1)      Push China to establish a democratic system based on free elections, with candidates from multiple parties.

2)      Push China to implement economic system based on private enterprise and fair competition.

3)      Maintain strong pressures in strategic locations surrounding China, to counter the intentions of the Chinese communist regime to spread its influence throughout the region.  American must also continue to combat totalitarianism in other parts of the world.  This will prevent America from losing allies in the region surrounding China, and promote, if nothing else, a gradual transformation in China as other totalitarian regimes transform or cease to exist.

(End)

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中文版

Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition News and Article Release Issue: A34-M4

中国民主运动海外联席会议新闻与文章发布号：A34-M4

Release Date: October 25, 2003

发布日：2003年10月25日

Topic: Refocus Global Attention to China’s Political Transformation（Fang, Jue）

标题：中国的转型与全球战略重点的再转移 (方觉)

Original Language Version: Chinese

(English at beginning, Chinese version at the end)

Please visit our website if you have problem to read Chinese in this issue

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中国的转型与全球战略重点的再转移

方觉

2003年8月1日

(在美国哈佛大学的研究报告)

共产主义中国的转型,是冷战之后主要的全球性问题。

2001年的"9.11事件",使全球战略重点发生了突然转变。

随着清除国际恐怖主义的斗争在今后几年达到基本目标,全球战略重点有必要再次转移。

全球战略重点的再转移,是为了推动中国完成转型,从而为建立新的国际秩序和国际体系创造最重要的条件。

1.中国转型的评估标准

对东欧共产主义国家和苏联的转型,存在着公认的评估标准。

但是,对中国的转型似乎没有明确的评估标准。

中国的共产主义制度同当年苏联-东欧共产主义国家的制度没有本质的不同,因此对

中国的转型不应该实行另一种评估标准。

中国的转型至少应该包含下述两方面的内容:

1)启动真正意义上的民主进程,在这个进程中,共产党需要承认政治反对派的合法地

位,允许政治竞争,通过普遍,直接,自由的选举产生中国的各级政府领导人和各级人民代表大会代表。

2)进行国有企业的大规模的私有化,允许私人企业进入一切经济领域,建立以私人企

业为主导的自由市场经济。

以这两项基本标准衡量,中国还没有出现实质性的转型。

1991年苏联-东欧共产主义国家制度崩溃后,中国领导层的根本方针不是学习苏联-东欧的转型经验,而是阻止中国产生转型过程。

直到最新的中国共产党的第十六次代表大会,仍然对中国的转型作出了否定的回答。这次代表大会的主旨报告强调了5个问题（以下引用报告原文）:

1)"二十世纪八十年代末九十年代初,国内发生严重政治风波,东欧剧变,苏联解体,

世界社会主义出现严重曲折,我国社会主义事业的发展面临空前巨大的困难和压力。在这个决定党和国家前途命运的重大历史关头,党中央成功地稳住了改革和发展的大局,捍卫了中国特色社会主义伟大事业。”

2)"实施党对国家和社会的领导"

"党委在同级各种组织中发挥领导核心作用。"

"使党的主张成为国家意志,使党组织推荐的人选成为国家政权机关的领导人员"

3)"必须坚持马克思列宁主义,毛泽东思想和邓小平理论在意识形态领域的指导地位

。"

4)"要毫不动摇地坚持党领导人民军队的根本原则和制度。"

5)"必须毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济,发展壮大国有经济,国有经济控制国民经济命脉。"

      上述保守立场得到了中国新领导层的一致通过。

2002年11月至2003年3月产生的中国的新的领导层,已经在下述4个有指标性意义的重大事件上展现了保守的政治方向:

1)2003年上半年,中国的人权状况不但没有进步,反而出现退步。有比以往更多的持不同政见者被关押或判刑,独立的宗教活动和劳工运动继续受到迫害,中国政府在上一年向民主国家和国际组织承诺的改善人权状况的措施并没有兑现。­

2)2003年春季SARS病由在中国国内迅猛蔓延发展到向国际社会迅速传播,但是中国政府并没有真正反省掩盖SARS问题的错误做法,迈出新闻自由的步伐,相反,当SARS的高峰刚刚过去,中国政府就加强了对媒体和公众舆论的进一步的控制。

3)中国共产党新的总书记在他2003年7月1日的讲话中,完全没有像某些中国人和西方人共同预计的那样,提出政治改革的主张,而是重申了他的前任的保守思想和保守路线。®

4)2003年7月1日50万香港人民举行抗议示威,反对在香港制定侵犯政治自由的安全法,要求香港实行民主化。在此之后不到20天,中国新的国家主席和新的总理分别表态:香港必须制定安全法,中国政府继续支持已经失去民心的香港最高行政长官,中国政府坚持拖延香港的民主进程。

尽管中国新的领导层在某些次要问题上存在分歧并且有派别之争,但是没有事实可以证明他们在主要问题上存在着对立。很难想像中国新领导层内有准备推动中国转型的健康力量。

2. 中国的战略态势

苏联-东欧共产主义国家集团崩溃后,中共政权为了预防中国转型,一方面竭力压制国

内的民主化要求,另一方面认真地将以美国为首的民主国家视为主要的战略对手。

以高速的经济增长和高速的军备增长为后盾,中国展开了它的战略态势。

·        在东北亚,中国是北朝鲜的主要援助者,中国支持北朝鲜保持极权政权和庞大的军队,作为抗衡美国及其盟国的战略前沿;

·        在台湾海峡,中国坚持对台湾的军事威胁,这不仅是为了防止"台湾独立",而且是为了削弱美国在亚洲的战略影响,并且通过制造台湾海峡的人为紧张，胁迫美国在其它方面对中国作出让步;

·        在东南亚,一方面中国不放弃对南中国海争议岛屿的军事压力,以此牵制东南亚国家联盟不要过份靠近美国;另一方面,中国支持缅甸的军事独裁政权,从而在东南亚地区保持一个反民主和反西方的盟友;

·        在南亚,中国支持巴基斯坦的军事独裁政权和那里的核开发与导弹开发,目的是鼓励巴基斯坦同西方保持距离，并利用巴基斯坦抗衡对中国有地区竞争能力的民主的印度;

·        在中亚,中国主持几个前共产主义国家组成新的集团势力"上海合作组织",试图将民主国家的战略影响排斥在该地区之外;

·        在中东,中国援助伊朗的神教政权和导弹开发,向叙利亚和利比亚进行武器和敏感技术扩散,长期偏袒伊拉克的前独裁政权,努力增强流氓国家对抗民主国家的力量;

·        中国和俄罗斯在战略上和外交上互相支持,联手制衡美国在世界的领导作用,力图在国际体系中保留两个非民主的世界大国。

冷战之后中国的基本战略方针,是阻挠建立由美国为首的民主国家主导的新的国际秩序和国际体系,保护自己的一党专制。为此,中国强调反对"美国的霸权主义",主张建立专制国家同民主国家"平分秋色"的"多极世界",有针对性地提出"加紧军事斗争准备,争取打赢高技术条件下的局部战争"。

3.中国转型的内部因素

中国内部有可能影响转型的其它因素最终能否实现中国的转型,存在着极大的疑问。

1)私人企业家与市场经济

通常认为,中国私人企业家的增多和市场因素的增长,将会导致中国走向自由化和民主化。这种看法过于简单化。

中国私人企业的生存与发展,很大程度上要依赖中共政权和中共官员的保护,特许,优惠。特别是规模较大的私人企业的成长,往往需要获取中共政权和中共官员控制的公共资源(土地,贷款,公司股票上市,等等)。为了自身的利益,大多数私人企业家倾向于支持中共政权而不是倾向于民主。尤其是资本较大的私人企业家,一般来说总是靠拢中共政权,拉拢中共官员。最近几年揭露出的若干知名私人企业家同高级官员之间的腐败关系,典型地说明了中国私人企业家的实际政治态度。

中国的市场因素在最近25年明显增加。但是中国并没有实行充分的自由市场经济。中共政权仍然控制着主要经济资源(垄断性的大型企业,银行,重要的能源和原料,等等),国有经济仍然占主导地位,政府的具有政治意图的经济规划和经济政策仍然决定着中国经济的走向。从这个意义上讲,计划经济并没有完全消失。中国经济改革的底线是:中共政权不准备允许私人企业成为中国经济的主体,不准备放弃政府对主要经济活动的控制。因为不这样做,中共政权有可能失去它的经济基础,进而有可能动摇它的政治权力。

所有已经转型的共产主义国家,没有一个是通过私人企业的成长和市场因素的扩大导致了制度的改变。恰恰相反,所有已经转型的共产主义国家,都是首先进行了民主改革,通过民主改革实现了制度改变,进而打开了私有化和市场经济的大门。因为共产主义国家的特点是极权的政治制度决定垄断的国有经济。在政治制度没有改变的情况下,经济制度不会发生根本改变。没有迹象显示中国的软弱的私人企业家和有限的市场经济具有决定中国转型的政治作用。

2)知识分子

中国的知识分子中公开信奉自由主义和民主主义的人数还很少,由于中共政权的压制,他们的思想影响不易扩大,也难于走向政治行动。

在中共政权垄断着教育和媒体的情况下,大多数知识分子接触现代思想和世界信息的机会十分有限,从而限制了他们的精神追求和政治选择。

很多知识分子仍然只能在中共政权直接或间接控制的机构工作,他们为了生存必须认同官方的意识形态。不少知识分子正在把主要注意力放在谋求"致富"上。

更有现实意义的是,中共政权通过向一部分知识分子提供比较高的收入,比较好的生活条件,比较大的专业名望或比较重要的职位,诱使他们忠实于共产主义政权。这种收买式的做法不无成效。上世纪90年代以来,确实有一部分中国知识分子为了追求个人利益而成为共产主义政权的积极拥护者和庸俗的辩护者。

所有这一切告诉人们,不应该对知识分子推动中国转型的精神作用和政治作用估计过高。

3)劳工运动

一种值得重视的积极现象是,最近几年中国的劳工运动开始出现,几千人或几万人参加的劳工抗议至少发生过几十次,规模较小的劳工抗议则更多。

中国的劳工运动主要有两部分参加者:城市的贫困工人和农村的贫苦农民。中国的城市工人超过1亿,至少有1/3处于失业或半失业状态。中国的农民大约有9亿,一般认为至少有2亿农民处于公认的贫困之中。劳工运动潜在的力量可想而知。

城市的劳工运动的现实目标通常是要求就业保障和失业救济,农村的劳工运动的主要诉求是反对政府的某些专横措施,不合理的收费等等。由于中国的贫富差距有扩大的趋势,政府的腐败与治理不善难以改观,对失业人员和贫困人口的救助将长期不足,因此今后中国的劳工抗议很可能增多。

劳工运动使中共政权处于政治上的尴尬状态:它不能全面镇压人数众多的抗议的劳工。2003年5月中国政府对领导2002年春天东北一个城市的几万名示威工人的两位工人领袖分别判处了7年和4年刑罚,主要用意是恐吓其它有抗议念头的劳工。但是,对社会底层的那些贫困甚至绝望的人来说,个别人的几年徒刑并不构成巨大的恐惧。因此,当中国政府作出了上述警告性的判决之后,在中国的若干城市仍然发生了多起劳工抗议。这预示着劳工运动还有存在的空间。

中共政权抑制劳工运动的主要手段,是严格禁止独立工会和独立的农民组织。由于无法产生独立的劳工组织,更无法产生能够相互支持,彼此联合的多样化的劳工组织,因而中国的劳工运动不大可能发展成大规模的具有重要政治影响的抗议浪潮。

4)宗教自由运动

另一个值得重视的积极现象是,一些年来中国独立于官方教会的宗教自由运动持续发展。

特别有意义的是独立的基督教(新教)活动和独立的天主教活动。据估计参加这类活动的信徒达到数千万之多。这类活动使中国人口的一部分通过宗教形式同西方主流文明相接触。

宗教自由运动在两个方面对共产主义制度发生着一定程度的分解作用:在精神信仰上,它正在摆脱共产主义的意识形态;在组织形式上,它正在试图同西方的教会组织或罗马教廷建立直接联系。

中共政权对独立的基督教(新教)活动和独立的天主教活动不断进行压制,有时甚至监禁致力于传教的神职人员。但是,有信仰的人往往没有畏惧。中共政权对宗教自由的镇压不可能取得明显成效。

但是,中共政权抑制宗教自由的长期手段,是禁止在中国公开存在独立的教会并禁止任何独立的宗教活动同西方的教会组织或罗马教廷形成直接关系。在真正打破中共政权的这一禁止之前,宗教自由运动对共产主义制度的分解作用将受到很大限制。

5)少数民族自治

如果注意到中国境内的主要少数民族生活的区域(西藏,新疆,青海,内蒙古等)占中国领土的一半以上,而且这些少数民族地区归入中国版图的时间并不太久,那么就会对中国的少数民族自治的意义产生更深刻的印象。

以达赖喇嘛为首的藏族流亡政府正在寻求藏族地区的真正自治,这一坚持了40年以上的民族运动获得了大多数藏人的认可。

新疆地区众多的信仰伊斯兰教的民族对他们的政治权利,经济利益,文化特征被侵蚀表示了越来越多的不满和抗议。

内蒙古的蒙古人对这个地区日益严重的"汉化"趋势感到深切的忧虑。

尽管中共政权对少数民族自治运动施加了持续不断的压力,但是完全中止这一运动的发展是不可能的。少数民族自治运动在两个方面削弱了中共政权:在广大地区产生着对中共政权的整个民族的离心力;使中共政权在漫长的陆地边疆面临着潜在的战略不稳定。

但是,由于中共政权拥有对少数民族占明显优势的经济力量和军事力量,因此,如果不能在中国确认民族自决原则,少数民族自治的目标很难真正实现。

4.中国转型的外部因素

迄今为止,那些有可能影响中国转型的外部因素,似乎没有产生重大的作用。

1)人权外交

西方的人权外交的意义不仅是改善专制国家的人权状况,而且是要推进专制国家的民主变革。没有民主变革,人权状况不可能得到持续的,结构性的改善,因为侵犯人权的根源正是专制制度和独裁政权。

对华人权政策如果没有民主目标,就会大大减弱对中国的实际影响。

多年来对华人权政策的主要成果,是促使中国政府释放了少量知名的政治犯。但是,这并不是中国政府向西方提供的免费的午餐。这实际上是一种交换,西方必须向中国作出回报。

中共政权并不打算实质性地改善中国的人权状况,它主要是利用人权问题同以美国为代表的西方国家做交易。在过去的知名政治犯陆续释放了之后,中国政府最近正在积极创造新的"知名政治犯",而美国则可能为了营救那些新的"知名政治犯"向中国提供新的回报。这就使人权外交继续处于某种有利于中国政府的不良循环:中国不断地制造"政治犯",美国不断地为救助政治犯作出努力和回报,但是中国的人权状况并没有不可逆转地改善。

中国政府知道,人权问题的核心是民主问题。它不准备在根本性的民主问题上作出让步。因此,它千方百计地迫使西方人权外交的中心局限于政治犯个案。

2)对华投资与贸易

西方对中国的投资和贸易能够在多大程度上影响中国的转型,现在还看不清楚。

当西方接纳中国进入世界贸易组织(WTO)时,它并没有相应地要求中国开始私有化进程并实行充分的自由市场经济。也就是说,中国加入WTO不但没有政治制度转型的前提，甚至没有经济制度转型的前提,这在WTO的历史上可能是奇特的。

无需置疑,西方在中国的巨额投资和大量贸易,对扩大中国的市场经济成份并提高中国的消费水平产生了积极的作用。但是,正如中共政权不会允许国内的私人企业成长为主导性的经济力量,中共政权同样不会允许外国企业同垄断性的国有企业展开完全平等的竞争,而且将会长期限制外国资本和外国商品在中国市场的活动。原因是同一个：中共政权要保持自己在国内占优势地位的经济实力和政治影响。

不仅如此。现有的对华投资和贸易除了积极作用之外,也存在着某些妨碍中国转型的消极作用。例如,不少西方的在华企业中并没有工会组织,或者只有中国官方的工会的分支。又如,一些西方的在华企业竟然默许中国共产党在外国企业中建立党组织。这类做法既无助于中国的独立的工会运动的形成,也无助于限制中共的极权主义。

更令人深思的是,西方企业同共产党的国有企业(其中一部分是军工企业)的合资或合作,对增强共产主义政权的经济实力起到了不可替代的作用。而某些西方企业向中国出口的敏感设备和转让的敏感技术,则直接帮助了中国改进国防工业和提高军事技术。人们注意到美国政府近年处罚了有这种行为的个别的美国知名公司。¯ 但是实际存在的事例可能比暴露出来的更多。

分析一种类似的现象或许具有启发性:中国是目前世界上对互联网监控最严格的国家,中国的警察系统使用了世界上人数最多的监控互联网的专业人员。但是,中国本身没有 能够有效监控互联网的高级技术,中国监控互联网的主要设备和关键技术很多是从美国公司购买的。° 这就形成了一组相互矛盾的画面:向往自由和民主的中国网民在互联网上苦苦搜寻着来自西方的新闻或信息;美国公司无所顾忌地向中国政府出售扼杀新闻自由和信息流动的工具。这个现象生动地表现了西方的对华经济活动有时候并非有利于中国的转型。

对华投资和贸易给一部分西方公司带来了利润和就业机会,但是这仅仅是硬币的一面。硬币的另一面则是:在中国的低工资吸引了大量外资和中国的低成本商品大量出口的冲击下,美国国内的制造业正在失去越来越多的利润和就业机会,而且美国每年承受着高达一千亿美元的巨额外贸逆差。特别重要的是,对华经济活动在西方形成了一种特殊利益集团,它们花费大量的资金和时间进行政治游说,试图夸大对华投资和贸易对中国转型的积极作用以及对西方经济的好处。对华特殊利益集团在西方对华政策的形成过程中似乎拥有太大的影响。在一个存在着多种利益集团的民主社会中,这至少不是一种平衡的情况。

3)人员交流

大量来自中国的学生和学者在西方学习或研究,使得一些人产生了富于想像力的预测:那些在西方接受过教育的中国人将会在中国的转型过程中举足轻重。

但是实际情况不一定令人鼓舞。

由中国政府公派到西方学习或研究的中国人,都经过了严格的政治审查,他们往往认同共产主义或民族主义。他们被派到西方的主要任务,是掌握西方的先进的科学技术或有用的管理知识,以便回国后更好地为共产党政权服务。

数量更多的通过非政府渠道来西方学习的中国人,绝大多数主要感兴趣的是在西方取得学历,收入和新的身份(永久居留权或国籍),而不是怎样使中国成为民主国家和自由社会。

近年来在中国政府的鼓励和引诱下,一些在西方工作和生活的中国人回国开展商业活动或技术活动。但是他们并没有像某些人所期待的那样,积极地促进中国的公平竞争,廉洁行政和法治。相反,他们当中的不少人正在积极地通过歌颂共产党政权换取特殊的好处,正在积极地模仿中国的腐败手段和腐化生活。

毫无疑问,到西方学习,工作,访问的中国人或多或少地受到了自由理念和民主思想的熏陶,这对中国社会的文明化会起到一定的作用。但是没有证据显示他们有可能形成推动中国转型的重要的政治力量或社会力量。

5.下一个全球战略重点

如前所述,中国共产党的领导层拒绝转型，而现有的可能影响中国转型的内部因素,无法强大到实现中国的转型，现有的可能影响中国转型的外部因素,也无法有效地推进中国的转型。

中国长期不能转型,不仅将使世界1/5以上的人民得不到基本的自由和民主,而且将使中共政权继续阻挠建立以美国为首的民主国家为主导的新的国际秩序和国际体系。

"9.11"事件发生后,民主国家将全球战略重点转向打击恐怖主义,这是必要的。

恐怖主义在民主国家的占绝对优势的力量面前,已经受到重创。那些支持恐怖主义的流氓政权,有的被顺利地推翻,有的正在受到更有力的威慑与遏制。有理由相信,在未来的几年中,打击恐怖主义和反对流氓国家的全球斗争将会取得决定性的胜利。

但是到那个时候,共产主义中国依然存在。共产主义中国依然是唯一拥有同民主国家抗衡的政治意愿和战略力量的大国。

到那个时候,民主国家就有必要将促进中国的转型确定为新的全球战略重点。

如果说苏联-东欧共产主义国家集团的崩溃,消除了中国防止转型的旧的战略屏障,

那么清扫了国际恐怖主义和流氓国家,就将消除中国防止转型的新的战略屏障。这是冷战之后在全世界最终结束共产主义制度和一切极权制度的历史机遇。

未来的推动中国转型的全球战略,需要建立在3个基点上:

1)促进中国建立以多党竞争的自由选举为基础的民主制度;

2)促进中国实行以私人企业为主体的经济制度;

3)为了保证中国转型进程的持续并抑制中共政权的战略态势,美国及其盟国应该在中国的周边地区保持足够有力的战略存在,并在世界其它地方阻断中共政权同独裁国家,专制国家的战略合作。

                       （ 全文完 ）

以上为编者向您们推荐的文章。文中作者的观点并不代表本基金会或魏京生先生本人的观点与立场。

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